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ABSTRACT 
This thesis identifies the correlation between the quality of the U.S. 
president’s relationship with the intelligence community and intelligence failures. This 
research also evaluates how the relationship changes over the course of a presidency 
in an effort to identify factors that contribute to a working relationship strong enough 
to mitigate the risk of intelligence failures. Case studies are used to establish the 
character of the relationships between Presidents John F. Kennedy, George H. W. 
Bush, and George W. Bush and their supporting intelligence communities. These 
relationships are then used to analyze intelligence and operational successes and 
failures that occurred during their respective presidencies. This thesis determined that, 
in general, a good relationship with the president increases the intelligence 
community’s chances for success, and a negative relationship increases the chance for 
failure. Additionally, once failure has occurred, if a president is receptive to 
intelligence and change, the relationship will improve. This thesis also found that the 
intelligence community must establish trust and communication with a receptive 
president to form a working relationship, and recommends that a newly elected 
president carefully appoint a trusted, non-political Director of National 
Intelligence upon taking office.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. STUDY INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
When a newly-elected president takes office in the United States, he assumes 
command of the world’s most powerful military as well as the world’s largest national 
Intelligence Community (IC) with the most widespread collection capabilities.1 
Furthermore, he inherits responsibility for the intelligence community’s current and 
planned operations. The president’s choice to further employ the instruments of national 
power, to include the military, is often based on the information he receives from the IC. 
As is discussed in depth in the literature review, the IC’s dissemination of faulty 
information, inability to communicate critical information, or failure to collect requisite 
information can lead the president to make suboptimal choices. Less studied, however, is 
the importance of the relationship between the president and the IC, the ways in which 
that relationship affects operational outcomes, and how that relationship evolves based on 
those outcomes. Therefore, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: Does the 
relationship between the president and IC affect the chance of an intelligence failure 
occurring? What impact does a failure or success have on the relationship between the 
president and IC?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
From the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941 to the rise of the 
Islamic State in 2013, intelligence failures continue to occur, leaving political and 
military leaders surprised and reactive, instead of proactively deescalating or countering 
potential crises. A president’s relationship with the Intelligence Community can 
significantly impact the employment of the military and its chances for success or failure. 
Furthermore, as the president’s term continues, the relationship is subject to change based 
on the performance of the IC or personalities therein. Failed operations can be costly, not 
                                                 
1 Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 5 
(2013): 684, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699285.  
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only in terms of the actual financial expense to conduct the operation, but also in terms of 
lost lives, equipment, and political capital. As a result, mitigating intelligence failures is 
essential in reducing unnecessary resource expenditures and political embarrassment. 
Analyzing past presidents’ relationships with the IC can provide insight into how the IC 
can best support the president to decrease failures and the costs and embarrassments 
associated with those failures.  
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
This thesis asks the following: as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) or 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the representative of the Intelligence 
Community, is the relationship between the DCI/DNI and U.S. president representative 
of the president’s relationship with the IC as a whole?2 Then, through case study analysis, 
asks does a positive working relationship between the president and IC decrease the 
likelihood of intelligence failures, whereas a negative relationship between the president 
and IC lend itself to failures. The thesis will concurrently analyze how those successes or 
failures subsequently improve or diminish the relationship. In doing so, this thesis seeks 
to identify commonly occurring factors that contribute to a positive relationship, which 
will, in turn, serve to mitigate future intelligence failures. Because this thesis focuses on 
the DCI/DNI, it will only address U.S. intelligence failures or successes.  
While U.S. history is replete in examples of operations and intelligence successes 
and failures, due to limited time and resources, this study only conducts a brief 
examination of the George W. Bush presidency and an in-depth examination of four 
successes or failures: The Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Operation Just Cause, 
Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The cases selected for in-depth analysis were chosen for 
several reasons. First, cases were selected based upon the availability of information. A 
high volume of declassified information regarding the president and the individual events 
                                                 
2 The evolution of the DCI into the DNI as well as the differences in the positions will be explained in 
depth in Chapter II; however, the key similarity between the positions that this thesis focuses on is the fact 
that the position is recognized as the principal intelligence adviser to the president. The DCI was mandated 
as such by the National Security Act of 1947. Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the position of DCI was dissolved, and the DNI was created 
as the principal intelligence adviser.  
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evaluated needed to exist for this research to accurately determine the quality of the 
relationships that existed between the president and IC. The Bay of Pigs and Cuban 
Missile Crisis both occurred during John F. Kennedy’s presidency, which is well 
documented and largely declassified. This allows it to serve as a basis for understanding 
the significance of relationships. Although George H. W. Bush’s presidency is not as 
heavily documented, enough information exists regarding his time as DCI, Vice 
president, and president to determine the relationship he enjoyed with the IC. Information 
regarding Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm was plentiful enough 
to evaluate the impacts of that relationship on those successes. Second, cases were 
selected to test the various aspects of the thesis questions.  
Although research conducted indicated enough information available to study a 
variety of presidents, the Kennedy and Bush presidencies offered the best chances for 
comparison based on early similarities excluding their relationship with the IC. Both 
presidents inherited a covert action mission to remove a world leader from power, but the 
presidents had strikingly different relationships with the IC and different results when the 
operations were executed. Kennedy’s early relationship with IC was less than optimal. 
Studying the early relationship, its impacts on the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion,3 
and the resulting changes examines the effects of a poor relationship. The IC’s 
contribution in the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis begins to underscore 
the importance of a good relationship. George H. W. Bush exemplified a strong 
presidential relationship with the IC. Studying Operation Just Cause and Operations 
Desert Shield/Storm will provide further insight into whether the good relationship Bush 
enjoyed with the IC impacted success and how the relationship was impacted by success. 
Finally, because George H. W. Bush and Kennedy case studies supported the importance 
of a good relationship between the IC and president, the George W. Bush presidency is 
briefly evaluated because it should fit the model, but, instead had the opposite outcome 
when compared to the other findings. Like his father, President George W. Bush enjoyed 
                                                 
3 Although the relationship is not the only factor that contributed to the failed invasion of the Bay of 
Pigs, this thesis will only examine the impact the relationship.  
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a good working relationship with the IC; however, his presidency witnessed far more 
failures than his father’s, so evaluating these cases will illuminate key differences.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In his first message as Secretary of Defense, James Mattis emphasized the 
importance of the IC in national security when he stated that, “together with the 
Intelligence Community we [Department of Defense] are the sentinels and guardians of 
our nation.”4 Ideally, the U.S. intelligence apparatus would be well prepared to detect and 
quickly report impending attacks or threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad so 
leaders can counter, deter, or deescalate these situations. However, this is not always 
possible for a multitude of reasons, to include resources, experience, and individual rights 
to privacy. As a result, stated simply: intelligence failures occur. In fact, as pointed out by 
Professor and CIA editor, John Hedley, “allegations of intelligence failure are a ‘given,’ 
if for no other reason than the fact that politicians and public servants abhor being caught 
off guard.”5 Just because intelligence failures are common does not mean that efforts 
should not be undertaken to address common causes, thus minimizing future failures. 
To establish relevancy, answer thesis questions, and prevent duplicative efforts, 
research for this thesis was conducted in the following fields: theories of intelligence 
failure, history and evolution of the Intelligence Community, and presidential histories. 
Literature concerning theories of intelligence failures was reviewed to determine if a link 
between intelligence failures and relationships had previously been established. The 
literature regarding failures was found to primarily focus on the cause of a single event 
and propose a theory based on that event; however, the significance of relationships and 
their impact on success or failures was largely absent from the single event studies, and 
left unaddressed in most theories. Literature regarding the history and evolution of the IC 
was reviewed to determine if, in evaluating the history of the IC, any academic writings 
                                                 
4 James Mattis, Message to the Department of Defense from Secretary of Defense James Mattis, 
release no: NR-020-17, January 20, 2017.  
5 John Hollister Hedley, “Learning from Intelligence Failures,” International Journal of Intelligence 
and CounterIntelligence 18, no.3 (2005): 436, 10.1080/08850600590945416. 
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had focused on the relationship between the IC and senior policymakers. This research 
illuminated the statutory formal requirements for the IC in supporting senior lawmakers, 
but these do not address the significance of a strong working relationship. The literature 
regarding presidencies tends to focus on the president’s actions and reactions during 
specific crises or review a specific tradition or document as it evolved across 
presidencies. In evaluating the literature, few writings exist that establish a connection 
between the president’s relationship with the IC and the likelihood that a failure will 
occur. More importantly, the writings that do evaluate the relationship tend to focus on to 
how best provide information to the president to prevent future failures without 
identifying what contributes to a good or bad relationship.  
1. Intelligence Failure Theories 
From renowned military historian Roberta Wohlstetter’s 1962 analysis of Pearl 
Harbor to Dr. Ephraim Kam’s article on the Islamic State’s surprising rise, a plethora of 
literature exists highlighting how and why faulty intelligence has resulted in vulnerability 
to attack, failed military operations, and threats to United States’ interests abroad.6 As 
noted by Professor Erik Dahl, however, the majority of the writing about intelligence 
failures agrees that the primary cause of failure is the failure of analysts to understand the 
signals and warnings available.7 As a result, the most widely accepted explanation for the 
cause of intelligence failures is the “signals to noise ratio” argument Wohlstetter 
presented in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. This argument has then been applied 
to other writings that focus on a single event regarded as an intelligence failure. Other 
writings on intelligence failure focus predominantly on inadequacies in the system—be 
they the structural organization or methods of producing intelligence—or failure on the 
part of policymakers to receive or act on the information. 
                                                 
6 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press,1962); Ephraim Kam, “The Islamic State Surprise: The Intelligence Perspective,” Strategic 
Assessment 18, no. 3 (October 2015). 
7 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 7.  
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Literature about specific events of intelligence failure often seeks to discover and 
possibly address problems that allowed the event to occur. This category includes authors 
such as Wohlstetter, Professor Robert Jervis, and Kam. It also includes reports such as 
the 9/11 Commission Report or investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack.  
Wohlstetter offers the most widely accepted theory of intelligence failure, but she 
derives it from and applies it only to the 1941 surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. In her Pearl 
Harbor: Warning and Decision, Wohlstetter conducts a thorough review of all “signals” 
and “noise”8 leading up to the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor to determine how and why 
the IC failed to predict the attack. In doing so, she concludes that deciphering the relevant 
signals from the noise was much easier to accomplish in retrospect than in real time.9 
While developing her theory, however, Wohlstetter did not examine the impact that the 
IC’s relationship with President Roosevelt had on the failure because centralized, 
strategic level, intelligence reporting to the president did not exist until President 
Truman’s directives that culminated in the National Security Act of 1947.10  
Although Jervis discusses the ties between policy and the IC in “Reports, Politics, 
and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” as the title implies, the report actually 
focuses on the causes for the intelligence failure regarding WMDs in Iraq. The report 
touches on politics, but focuses neither on the relationship between the IC and the 
president, nor the impact of that relationship. He broadly acknowledges  the importance 
of a relationship in his review of reports regarding pre-war assessments to invade Iraq, 
but did not investigate the relationship or its effects.11 He concludes that, although faulty 
                                                 
8 For the purpose of her analysis, Wohlstetter defines signal as “a clue or a sign or a piece of evidence 
that tells about a particular danger or a particular enemy move or intention,” and noise as competing or 
contradictory signals or “all sorts of information useless for anticipating this particular disaster.” 
Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 2–3.  
9 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 387. 
10 While the U.S. has engaged in intelligence collection operations since the American War for 
Independence, the National Security Act of 1947 was the document consolidating and centralizing 
intelligence reporting to the President. 
11 Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29, no. 1 (August 2006): 3–52, 10.1080/01402390600566282. 
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intelligence assessments and reports were made, it is unclear “whether the intelligence 
directly affected Bush and Blair” in their decision to go to war.12  
Failure theorists evaluating the inadequacies of processes and procedures or 
organization of the Intelligence Community often expose flaws, but rarely offer 
realistically testable solutions. Several authors, including 35-year intelligence veteran and 
professor, Arthur Hulnick, and Regent Professor Loch Johnson, identify flaws in the 
foundational aspects of intelligence like the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is 
the process in which collection requirements are fulfilled and is broken down into the 
following five phases: Planning and Direction; Collection; Processing and Exploiting; 
Analysis and Production; and Dissemination and Integration, with evaluation and 
feedback occurring through each phase.13 Johnson and Hulnick argue that intelligence 
failures are inevitable because the process incorrectly assumes that the steps will be 
conducted sequentially, and that policy makers direct collections and use the information 
to guide decisions.14 Professor Alan Breakspear, however, contends that Hulnick’s 
argument cannot be accurately evaluated because intelligence cannot be understood by or 
useful to leaders without a clear, consistent definition of intelligence, proposing the 
following:  
Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do 
something about it. The capability involves foresight and insight, and is 
intended to identify impending change, which may be positive, 
representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat.15 
While Hulnick, Breakspear, and Johnson make valid arguments, they fail to 
propose a testable solution. Redefining intelligence will surely improve communication 
                                                 
12 Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures,” 8. 
13 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2–0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joints of 
Staff, October 22, 2013), I-6.  
14 Arthur S. Hulnick, “What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle,” Intelligence and National Security 
21, no. 6 (2006): 959–979, 10.1080/02684520601046291; Loch K. Johnson, (1986) “Making the 
Intelligence “Cycle” Work,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 
1–23, 10.1080/08850608608435033. 
15 Alan Breakspear, “New Definition of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no.5 
(2013): 692, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699285.  
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because policy makers and analysts will be speaking the same language, but Breakspear 
fails to explain how the improved communication will prevent intelligence failures. 
Johnson discusses the intelligence cycle, and identifies CIA successes, but fails to explain 
how the intelligence cycle contributed to the successes. He also makes the important note 
that, “without an audience to listen … the importance of an analysts’ intelligence 
becomes irrelevant.”16 Hulnick disagrees with the principle of the intelligence cycle. He 
identifies its flaws and how those flaws contributed to the failure to predict the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 and how the flaws perpetuated the belief that Saddam 
Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After exposing the flaws, he proposes 
an alternative idea of “operating in parallel,” but does not explain how “operating in 
parallel” could be implemented and tested to prevent future failures.17  
Intelligence failure theories predominantly argue that intelligence failures occur 
because policymakers fail to listen to or act on accurate recommendations. In analyzing 
intelligence failures, Political Scientist and Professor of War and Peace Studies Richard 
Betts concludes that intelligence failures are inevitable because weak nations have 
deficient capabilities, leading to failures. On the other hand, strong nations, such as the 
United States, will suffer intelligence failures because mistakes will occasionally be made 
in analysis, but more often by decision makers for whom the intelligence is produced.18 
U.S. naval intelligence veteran and professor Erik Dahl also addressed the failure of 
policymakers, identifying receptivity to intelligence as a primary driver of failures. In 
establishing his “Theory of Preventative Action,” Dahl investigates conditions necessary 
for policymakers to be receptive to intelligence and concludes that a policymaker is 
receptive toward warning when and will react if the policymaker believes the threat is 
real and trusts the intelligence reporting.19 While both authors allude to faulty 
communication between the IC and policymakers as a contributing factor to intelligence 
                                                 
16 Johnson, “Making the Intelligence Cycle Work,” 20.  
17 Hulnick, “Intelligence Cycle,” 961.  
18 Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,” World 
Politics 31, no. 1 (Oct 1978): 61.  
19 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 178.  
 9
failures, the authors do not explore how communication is affected by or affects the 
policymaker’s relationship with the IC. Furthermore, neither author addresses how 
communication changes following an intelligence failure. 
The literature regarding theories of failure does not address or investigate the 
significance of the relationship between the policymakers and IC or how it might impact 
the frequency of failures. Betts began to explore the subject acknowledging that the most 
frequent breakdowns in intelligence occur in communicating intelligence to policymakers 
in a manner that impresses them to act.20 While this thesis identified communication as a 
key component to a strong relationship, Betts did not establish or pursue that link. Dahl 
identified belief in a threat and trust in intelligence as factors affecting policymakers’ 
receptivity to intelligence, but also did not pursue the significance of the relationship 
between the IC and policymakers.21 In fact, Dahl went a step beyond, to suggest further 
research on the impact a failure or success has on a policymaker’s receptivity to 
intelligence, which this thesis aims to address.22 
2. Intelligence Community Evolution 
Literature regarding the evolution of the Intelligence Community focuses 
predominantly on legislation establishing and modifying the modern Intelligence 
Community since its inception following World War II. The literature was reviewed in an 
effort to determine the legally mandated relationship between the president and the IC. 
Instead, it revealed that the president is under no legal obligation to receive intelligence 
briefings or reports, but that he has the obligation and authority to appoint the DCI/DNI 
to serve as the principal intelligence adviser and lead the IC.23  
The DCI/DNI also serves as the Intelligence Community’s representative to the 
president. Based on those premises, the DCI/DNI’s relationship with the president 
                                                 
20 Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision,” 63.  
21 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 178.  
22 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 179.  
23 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(a)(1), (1947).  
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equates to the president’s relationship with the community as a whole. That does not 
mean, however, that all members of the IC agree with everything their representative 
says, similar to a constituent disagreeing with a stance her congressional representative 
took on a subject.  
Professor and literary critic, Michael Warner and CIA Chief Historian, J. Kenneth 
McDonald’s, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947,” served as a 
starting point for research into the legal framework of the IC. The report traced the 
beginning of the IC to April 1945, when President Truman launched an initiative to form 
a centralized intelligence system to prevent another Pearl Harbor.24 This led to the 
passage of the National Security Act of 1947.25 The National Security Act of 1947 
established the framework upon which the IC is currently built by legally mandating the 
following: the formation of the CIA, headed by the DCI, subservient to the National 
Security Council (NSC); the DCI is appointed by the president and confirmed by Senate; 
and the DCI is responsible for coordinating and reporting intelligence affecting national 
security to the NSC.26 Although it established the DCI as the head of the IC and 
established that he reports to the NSC (which is headed by the president), the National 
Security Act of 1947 did not mandate guidelines for how or when the DCI should report 
to the president. It also failed to provide guidance to the president and NSC on how to 
employ or empower the DCI. Because it did not dictate methods of communication or 
frequency of contact, the National Security Act of 1947 failed to legally cultivate a 
relationship—positive or negative—between the president and the IC, leaving the 
discussion about the necessity and effectiveness of the relationship open for research.  
Warner and McDonald traced the next major reforms to the Dulles Report in 
1949, followed by the Schlesinger Report in 1971, the Pike and Church committee 
reports in the 1970s, and finally, the 9/11 Commission Report, which resulted in the 
                                                 
24 Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 
1947,” Strategic Management Issues Office (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 
2005): 3.  
25 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 3.  
26 National Security Act of 1947. 
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Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.27 While each reforms will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter II, none of the pieces of legislation or reforms established a 
legal requirement or method of communication between the president and IC.  
3. History of Presidencies 
Because the link between presidential relationships with the Intelligence 
Community and its impact on failure has not yet been evaluated, much of the research 
conducted for this thesis examined presidential histories. The preponderance of literature 
on presidents comes in the form of memoirs or biographies. In addition, literature 
regarding presidential intelligence briefings and products were reviewed to derive each 
president’s relationship with the IC, and how that relationship changed over the course of 
presidencies.  
Memoirs and biographies provide a great deal of information regarding the 
formation of relationships or detailing events in order to explain how a president arrived 
at a foreign policy decision. However, the literature reviewed lacked much analysis on 
the relationship between the president and DCI or how that relationship impacted 
decision-making. For example, Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days chronicled 
President Kennedy’s actions and reactions throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, but does 
not discuss Kennedy’s relationship with DCI John A. McCone.28 Special Assistant to the 
President (Kennedy) Arthur Schlesinger’s, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House does a better job of explaining how Kennedy formed relationships as well as 
events that occurred during Kennedy’s presidency, but does not discuss how relationships 
changed and the impact of the change.  
Further literature regarding products and presidential histories came from 
Historian David Priess in his book, The President’s Book of Secrets, and CIA Inspector 
General John Helgerson’s Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of 
                                                 
27 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” iii–iv. 
28 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: WW Norton 
& Company, 2011). 
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Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004.29 Although these books focused on the 
development of the PDB and the way in which elected presidents were briefed prior to 
assuming office, respectively, they also provided a great deal of insight into relationships 
established between the president and IC. They did not, however, address the importance 
of the relationship, how that relationship impacted the president’s success or failure, or 
the ICs’ success or failure in supporting the president.  
Overall, although an abundance of literature exists regarding intelligence failures, 
none of that literature specifically examines the significance or impact of the president’s 
relationship with the Intelligence Community has on the frequency of intelligence 
failures.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Before analyzing the relationship between the president and the Intelligence 
Community and its impact on success or failure, standards for measuring the relationship 
must be established. This is accomplished in Chapter II by establishing that the 
relationship between the president and the Director of Current Intelligence or Director of 
National Intelligence is the same as the president’s relationship with the IC because the 
DCI/DNI is the principal intelligence adviser to the president and leader of the IC. 
Chapter II also elaborates on methods of communication between the president and IC 
and establish the significance of the PDB, and its precursor, the president’s Intelligence 
Checklist (PICL), as a standard for measuring the receptivity of the president to the IC. 
Chapter III then applies the standards described in Chapter II to President 
Kennedy to prove his relationship with the Intelligence Community contributed to the 
failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Reforms following that failure led to an improvement 
in the relationship, which facilitated the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Chapter III also illuminates factors necessary for the president to have a good relationship 
                                                 
29 David Priess, The President’s Book of Secrets (New York: Public Affairs, 2016); John L. 
Helgerson, Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004, 
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).   
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with the IC and illustrate how a relationship can change over the course of the 
presidency.  
While President Kennedy’s early relationship with the Intelligence Community 
was not optimal, resulting in an initial failure, Chapter IV examines the impacts of early 
success on an already excellent relationship by evaluating President George H. W. Bush’s 
presidency. Chapter IV first establishes why President George H. W. Bush’s relationship 
with the IC should be characterized as a good relationship. Chapter IV then identifies IC 
successes witnessed during his presidency, and concludes by analyzing how the working 
relationship between the president and IC impacted the chance of success and how the 
relationship was impacted by success.  
Chapter V will present a conclusion to the research questions and findings. This 
chapter also briefly addresses George W. Bush’s presidency, because it appears to serve 
as a counterargument, summarizes the findings of the thesis, identifies significant factors 
impacting relationships between presidents and the IC, makes recommendations that 
would result in a positive working relationship, and identifies areas for future research. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This study was undertaken to examine the impact a president’s relationship with 
the IC has on intelligence success or failure by asking following: Does a strong, working 
relationship between the president and the Intelligence Community, defined by clearly 
identified mechanisms for providing intelligence support to a receptive president who 
then provides feedback on the information he received,30 minimize intelligence failures 
occurring over the course of the presidency? Additionally, it serves to determine if a 
weak or negative working relationship between the president and IC will result in a 
substantial intelligence failure. Furthermore, if a presidency witnesses an intelligence 
failure, will he make changes to strengthen his relationship with the IC that will mitigate 
future failures during his presidency?  
                                                 
30 Mechanisms for relaying information to the president are identified and defined in Chapter 2. For 
awareness, this includes daily products, assuming the president reads and provides feedback on the 
document, or regular face-to-face briefings to a receptive president.  
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The findings from this study may determine whether a relationship does lead to 
success while failures are more likely to occur when a poor relationship exists. It also 
notes that a president with a poor relationship can make changes to improve the 
relationship which can lead to success. President Kennedy’s case demonstrated a 
counterproductive initial relationship; however, after failure and reforms in personnel and 
products, President Kennedy established a method for effective communication with the 
IC that led to successful operations for the remainder of his presidency. George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency also supported the correlation between a strong working relationship 
and operational success because his presidency witnessed success in Operation Just 
Cause and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The caveat to the findings occurs 
under President George W. Bush. This thesis, however, does not contend that a fruitful 
relationship between the president and the IC will guarantee success for the duration of 
the presidency or a poor relationship spell failure for operations conducted in the absence 
of a communicative relationship. Instead, it argues that communication is essential in a 
good relationship and in ensuring the president and his staff are receiving required 
support from the IC that will enable the president to make better informed decisions with 
a higher likelihood of success, as reflected in the cases examined. It also demonstrates the 
significance of the DCI’s political aspirations and highlights the importance of a 
president’s receptivity to change and information. 
 15
II. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the President of the United States and the Intelligence 
Community and its impacts on the success or failure throughout a Presidency is the focus 
of this thesis. Whereas responsibilities and office staff of the president have remained 
relatively constant over the course of this study, the intelligence community has not. As a 
result, understanding the purpose, history, membership, and structure of the intelligence 
community is necessary for establishing how to measure its relationship with the 
president, although these topics are not focus of the thesis. As a result, this chapter will 
provide only a general, wave-top analysis of the post-World War II intelligence 
community while acknowledging a longer, deeper, more nuanced history exists. This 
chapter will also address the mechanisms through which the president provides feedback 
and guidance to the intelligence community about the support he needs. Finally, in 
addressing the needs of the president, this chapter will establish that the relationship 
between the president and the DCI, or DNI depending on the presidency being examined, 
equates directly to the president’s relationship with the IC as a whole.  
B. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CREATION AND REFORMS 
Understanding the history and make-up of the modern American Intelligence 
Community is essential in understanding why the president’s relationship with the DCI, 
and now the DNI, can be equated to the Intelligence Community as a whole. Although 
the DNI has fewer responsibilities than the DCI did, the two positions shared two key 
similarities that this thesis will focus on: first, both positions were given the responsibility 
of collaborating, coordinating, and generally overseeing the entirety of the IC. Second, 
both positions serve(d) as the principal intelligence adviser to the president. In that 
respect, this chapter will illustrate how the DCI/DNI position was formed specifically to 
collaborate and coordinate the independent members of the intelligence community. With 
that responsibility, the DCI/DNI serves as a representative for the IC. The DNI/DCI is 
also responsible for ensuring executive receives relevant, timely intelligence to make 
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informed policy decision. As a result, the DCI/DNI serves as the IC’s representative to 
the president. Per the representative relationship between the DCI/DNI and IC, and the 
advisory responsibility the DCI/DNI has to the president, the deduction that the 
relationship between the president and DCI/DNI equates to the relationship the president 
had with the IC as a whole can be made. As weaknesses in the community and position 
were identified, reports and proposals have led to the issuing of executive orders and 
passing of legislation that has strengthened the DCI/DNI and community as a whole. As 
the reforms occurred and legislation was passed, the DCI/DNI’s role as the IC’s 
representative to the president was only strengthened because the reforms focused on 
centralizing the power over the IC with the DCI/DNI. Since World War II, the 
intelligence community was created and has undergone four major reforms—each 
following a significant event or failure.  
1. Creation of the Modern Intelligence Community and DCI 
Following World War II, the United States was globally acknowledged as a super 
power, but it faced an ideological adversary— the Soviet Union. As a result, President 
Harry Truman recognized the need for a formalized method of collating intelligence 
reports and coordinating intelligence resources to ensure he and other policymakers were 
as informed as possible about world events.31 At the conclusion of the war, more than 
forty agencies were collecting, producing, or disseminating intelligence. Intelligence 
professionals across the agencies recognized that the prewar intelligence system was 
broken, which allowed for the Pearl Harbor surprise attack.32 Furthermore, professionals 
realized the wartime system was chaotic, and the postwar system needed to be better than 
both the prewar system and wartime system.33 As a result, President Truman instructed 
the State Department to take the lead on forming the postwar intelligence office, much to 
the dismay of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the FBI, and State Department Special 
                                                 
31 Thomas F. Troy, “Truman on CIA,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified August 10, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol20no1/html/v20i1a02p_0001.htm#top. 
32 Troy, “Truman on CIA.” 
33 Troy, “Truman on CIA.” 
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Assistant for Research and Intelligence Alfred McCormack was given the job of creating 
the proposal.34 McCormack faced resistance from within the State Department, resulting 
in first having to secure his own position and office in the state intelligence apparatus 
before he could begin the undertaking of unifying intelligence efforts.35 Because he was 
not well informed on the community, he eventually agreed with a Budget Bureau study of 
intelligence and suggested the creation of a complex interdepartmental system dominated 
by State provided intelligence.36 Meanwhile, the War Department was preparing its own 
far simpler plan.37  
Special Assistant McCormack’s plan was heavily criticized. One critique came 
from Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (later the first appointed DCI) Admiral 
Sidney Souers who pointed out that McCormack’s plan gave the State Department too 
much control over intelligence.38 Furthermore, McCormack’s plan excluded the military 
advisers from impacting the president’s decisions although military advisers were more 
likely to provide unbiased intelligence.39 Souers went on to recommend the far simpler 
JCS plan.40 Truman agreed with Souers and pushed the JCS plan forward in January 
1946, after revisions.41 Although the revisions appeared to be minor, they significantly 
degraded the power of the newly created Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by making it 
dependent on other departments for funds, personnel, and facilities. Nonetheless, 
President Truman appointed Admiral Souers as the first DCI with the mission to 
“accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security 
                                                 
34 Troy, “Truman on CIA.”  
35 Troy, “Truman on CIA.” 
36 Troy, “Truman on CIA.” 
37 Troy, “Truman on CIA.” 
38 Sydney Souers, “Memorandum from the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (Souers) to Clark M. 
Clifford,” (official memorandum, Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, December 27, 1945), 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d64. 
39 Souers, “Memorandum from the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (Souers) to Clark M. 
Clifford.” 
40 Troy, “Truman on CIA.”  
41 Troy, “Truman on CIA.” 
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and appropriate dissemination within the Government and the resulting strategic and 
national policy intelligence.”42  
President Truman supported the JCS plan for the creation of a Central Intelligence 
Group (CIG) and DCI, after a lengthy, thoroughly debated process. According to the 
plan, the DCI would be responsible for overseeing the intelligence community and 
providing intelligence to the president. Most importantly, as Souers pointed out, “the 
President would appoint the Director, making it possible to procure a man of outstanding 
ability and integrity,” which supports the implication that the DCI should be able to 
establish rapport and trust to build a good relationship with the president.43 
The Central Intelligence Group was doomed from its creation because it was 
reliant on resources for the War Department, Department of State, and Department of the 
Navy, but that did not stop DCI Souers from working to expand and empower the 
organization. Following World War II, clandestine operations still needed a parent 
organization following the dissolution of the OSS. The creation of the CIG offered the 
disenfranchised officers of the OSS, now nested in the War Department, a better option 
for employment.44 As a result, the clandestine service officers lobbied for, and succeeded 
in, being transferred to the CIG, giving DCI Souers command of the majority of U.S. 
clandestine operations.45 DCI’s gaining control of clandestine operations has since only 
expanded and, as this study will later demonstrate, been a source of distrust between the 
president and IC. Furthermore, it has served to grant the IC a platform from which it can 
push a political agenda, which has resulted in a fractured relationship between the 
president and IC at times. The fractured relationship has contributed to operational and 
intelligence failures.  
                                                 
42 As quoted from Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 4.  
43 Souers, “Memorandum from the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (Souers) to Clark M. 
Clifford.” 
44 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 5. 
45 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 5. 
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The Central Intelligence Group was transformed into the Central Intelligence 
Agency and duly empowered when Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, 
providing statutory support and permanency to President Truman’s initiatives. According 
to the act, the CIA, under the presidentially appointed DCI, is responsible for 
coordinating United States’ intelligence activities and briefing intelligence reporting to 
the NSC.46 President Truman’s initiatives and the National Security Act of 1947 began 
the creation of the modern intelligence community. More importantly, the act created the 
DCI to oversee the community and correlate and consolidate the information generated. 
Finally, the act established the DCI’s reporting senior as the chairman of the National 
Security Council, a position held by the president. The National Security Act of 1947 also 
laid the framework to establish the DCI as the intelligence community so his relationship 
with the president is representative of the IC’s relationship with the president.  
2. Dulles’s Report and DCI Smith’s Changes Empowering the DCI 
Only a year after the creation of the CIA, NSC officials and the DCI asked Allen 
Dulles, William Jackson, and Matthias Correa to conduct a review of the CIA with the 
intent of determining how the NSC should oversee the agency.47 The result was the 1949 
Dulles Report. The Dulles Report concluded that the National Security Act of 1947 
provided necessary framework for the intelligence system to be built upon and argued 
that the CIA “should be empowered and encouraged to establish, through its Director, a 
closer liaison with the two members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly 
depends and who should be the main recipients of its products–the Secretary of State and 
Secretary of Defense.”48 The Dulles Report also found that the CIA was failing to 
execute its responsibility of coordinating intelligence activates relating to national 
security.49 The Dulles Report concluded that the CIA was formed in an effort to reduce 
                                                 
46 National Security Act of 1947. 
47 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 8. 
48 Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, “The Central Intelligence Agency and 
National Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Security Council” (January 30, 1949), 1.  
49 Dulles, Jackson and Correa, “The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for 
Intelligence,” 2–4. 
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the duplication of efforts across the IC, identify and remedy gaps in collections, and, 
instead of producing finished intelligence based on organic collections, it was to 
consolidate the information from other agencies to produce the most accurate 
assessments addressing national intelligence problems; in those duties, the CIA was 
failing, and the report attributed poor leadership as the cause of the problems.50 The NSC 
endorsed many of the report’s recommendations, but initially, balked at replacing DCI 
Hillenkoetter, until a significant event occurred to induce a change—the CIA’s failure to 
predict the North Korean invasion of South Korea.51 The failure prompted President 
Truman to appoint Walter Bedell Smith as DCI, effective October 7, 1950.  
DCI Smith was responsible for reshaping the intelligence system by encouraging 
cohesiveness and sharing between the independent organizations. Smith was also 
responsible for implementing many of the recommendations that came from the Dulles 
Report.52 Smith arrived at the CIA with the intent make lasting improvements, and 
started to do so by hiring two authors of the report from which he worked—William 
Jackson as Deputy DCI and Allen Dulles as deputy director for operations.53 Under 
Smith’s forceful leadership, the Board and Office of National Estimates was created to 
generate National Intelligence Estimates; the Office of Current Intelligence was formed 
to produce a daily bulletin for the president; and, after pleading with the NSC, the 
military signals intelligence capabilities were folded into a national mission set under the 
auspices of the newly formed National Intelligence Agency, although the branches 
maintained their respective cryptologic arms.54 
The Dulles Report, coincidental with the outbreak of the Korean War and 
subsequent appointment of Smith as DCI, significantly impacted the cohesiveness of the 
IC. Although the National Security Act of 1947 laid the groundwork for the DCI to speak 
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on behalf of the intelligence components, DCI Smith actually used that authority to unite 
and form an intelligence community that he could represent. Furthermore, DCI Smith’s 
changes within the CIA, specifically the creation of the current intelligence office, were 
instrumental in providing the groundwork for the DCI to develop a professional 
relationship with the president.  
3. Schlesinger’s Report Addressing Efficacy and Budgeting 
The 1960s saw improvements in technological collection capabilities, and with 
them, a commensurate increase in the intelligence budget. President Richard Nixon, 
however, did not believe a correlating improvement in intelligence analysis and 
production existed—especially after the CIA failed to predict the coup in Cambodia.55 As 
a result, President Nixon authorized Assistant Director of the White House Office of 
Management of Budget James Schlesinger to conduct a survey investigating resource 
management and analytical shortcomings within the intelligence community, and the 
result became known as The 1971 Schlesinger Report.56  
The 1971 Schlesinger Report identified two phenomena regarding the operations 
of the Intelligence Community: “The first is an impressive rise in their size and cost. The 
second is an apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope and 
overall quality of intelligence products.”57 While actual numbers remain classified, and 
thus redacted from the report, Schlesinger and his team determined that the procedures 
and responsibilities, outlined in the National Security Act of 1947 and that DCI Smith 
refined and implemented, in which intelligence collection and reporting were assigned by 
department or agency, had worked well through the 1950s, but divisions between types of 
intelligence, such as military vs. non-military or tactical vs. strategic, were no longer 
clear because the need and ability to collect on the Soviet Union and its nuclear program 
were concerns for the military as well as civilians; technological advances in collection 
capabilities such as satellite photography and signals intelligence were both strategic and 
                                                 
55 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 21. 
56 Warner and McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 21–22. 
57 James Schlesinger, “A Review of the Intelligence Community,” (March 10, 1971), 1. 
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tactical in nature.58 As a result, the IC had fallen back into the habit of duplicating efforts, 
a trend DCI Smith was thought to have corrected 10 years earlier.  
The significance of Schlesinger’s report lies in the recommendations proposed 
based on his conclusion: “while a number of specific measures may help to bring about a 
closer relationship between cost and effectiveness, the main hope for doing so lies in a 
fundamental reform of the intelligence community’s decisionmaking [sic] bodies and 
procedures.”59 Like the Dulles Report, Schlesinger attributed the increased spending with 
little improvement intelligence quality, to poor leadership. According Schlesinger’s 
findings, failing to give the DCI the  responsibility of planning and rationalizing 
collection priorities had resulted in the individual components of the IC fighting to 
acquire the most sophisticated collection capabilities to maintain relevance.60 This 
resulted in rapid, expensive, expansion and the resurgence of duplicative efforts across 
the components.61 To remedy this problem, Schlesinger went on to propose a myriad of 
solutions of varying severity, all with the intent to further centralize power to the DCI. Of 
Schlesinger’s recommendations, the following were implemented: the appointment of a 
Deputy DCI; appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the 
complete merger of the armed services cryptologic arm into the NSA; and the creation of 
new offices and staff to assist the DCI in analysis.62 Furthermore, due to the Schlesinger 
Report, every DCI since has been expected to oversee and prepare the IC’s budgets, 
establish collection requirements, prioritize assets, and implement and enforce quality 
control standards for intelligence products.63 
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To solve the leadership problem, Schlesinger was the first to call for a DNI, 
whose sole responsibility would be the management of the Intelligence Community with 
the power and authority to do so. While some of Schlesinger’s lesser recommendations 
were implemented, the Nixon administration, even with Schlesinger as DCI, were unable 
to fully implement the more radical changes envisioned, such as the establishment of the 
DNI, prior to the revelations of the Watergate Scandal and other incidents of misconduct 
committed by the intelligence community.64 Watergate and the IC’s infringements upon 
civil liberties forced Nixon’s resignation, soured the American public to the thought of an 
all-powerful intelligence leader, and led to Congressional inquiries into the actions of the 
CIA and IC as a whole.65 The idea of the creation of a DNI, however, remained a point of 
discussion.  
4. Church Committee Report and Congressional Oversight  
On December 22, 1974, a New York Times headline read, “Huge C.I.A. Operation 
Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,,” prompting 
Congress to launch the two most significant studies of intelligence during the 1970s. The 
first study was conducted by the Senate’s Church Committee, and the second, by the 
House’s Pike Committee.66 That headline, coupled with the Watergate Committee’s 
investigation and subsequent revelation of illegal executive authorization of domestic 
intelligence collection activities, led the Senate to launch an additional investigation into 
the possible misconduct of the intelligence community.67 Senator Church and his 
colleagues conducted a thorough review of all intelligence community activities and 
spent over a year composing their findings, “preparing one of the most detailed public 
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appraisals of any nation’s intelligence structure.”68 The Committee’s proposals regarding 
organization largely echoed prior executive reviews, namely the idea that the DCI should 
dedicate more time to managing the IC and focus less on running the CIA, but the bulk of 
the study and recommendations regarded the powers and accountability of clandestine 
operations.69 Grudgingly, the report concluded that although, domestically, mistakes had 
been made and laws had been broken, the foreign activities the IC was conducting were 
paramount to national security and should be continued, but with additional oversight.70 
The Congressionally-launched investigations also spurred executive action 
regarding the oversight and management of the intelligence community in the form of 
Executive Orders that impact collections to this day. President Gerald Ford, in the wake 
of the investigations, passed Executive Order 11905, that President Jimmy Carter 
supplanted with Executive Order 12036, which among other things, officially appointed 
DCI as the head of the intelligence community and limited the DCI’s role as director of 
the CIA.71 These executive orders, to include President Ronald Reagan’s EO12333 also 
increased executive oversight of the intelligence community and restricted activities to 
include domestic collection activities as well as banned political assassinations abroad.72  
Although the reports varied in findings, the effects were similar. Both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate established permanent committees to oversee 
intelligence activities. Congressional oversight encouraged a more disciplined and ethical 
IC, and, in conjunction with the appropriations committees, made the IC more 
accountable for its actions and spending to both Congress and the president whereas 
before, the IC was only accountable to the president.73  The additional oversight also had 
the added benefit of curbing investigations and reviews of the IC for years to come, 
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lending an explanation as to why the next investigation and subsequent changes occurred 
nearly 20 years later following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.   
5. Post-9/11 Reforms  
The most recent and substantial changes to date for the Intelligence Community 
came following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission 
Report concluded that the IC was still structured and reported in a manner suitable for 
specialized mission sets dedicated to tracking Cold War targets instead of being an 
integrated community capable of seamless sharing of information which contributed in 
part to the failure of the community to analyze the terrorist threat.74 They went on to 
outline six problems that contributed to the failures that could be remedied with a simple 
restructure: central to this argument was the recognition that the DCI was over-
encumbered in responsibilities enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947, and, 
with the advancement of defense department organic collection capabilities, the DCI’s 
ability to influence and prioritize collection resources has diminished.75 The report goes 
so far as to state:  
The DCI now has at least three jobs. He is expected to run a particular 
agency, the CIA. He is expected to manage the loose confederation of 
agencies that is the intelligence community. He is expected to be the 
analyst in chief for the government, sifting evidence and directly briefing 
the President as his principal intelligence adviser. No recent DCI has been 
able to do all three effectively. Usually what loses out is management of 
the intelligence community, a difficult task even in the best case because 
the DCI’s current authorities are weak.76 
The report went on to note that the DCI lacked the ability to control the budget, hire or 
fire senior managers, or establish and enforce analytical procedures and standards across 
the community.77 The natural solution to remedy the DCI’s workload and lack of 
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authority was to create the position Schlesinger advocated for thirty years earlier: A 
director of national intelligence. The committee advocated for a “National Intelligence 
Director” whose primary responsibility would be to act as the principal intelligence 
adviser to the president and would also be responsible overseeing and managing the 
budget for the IC.78 In creating an oversight position, the position of DCI would be 
dissolved, freeing the former DCI to focus on the CIA instead of running the community 
as a whole, while running the CIA, and serving to advise the president. The 
recommendation was received and fully implemented, first with executive orders, and 
then with Congress’s passing of the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  
The passing of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 was the 
largest reform of the Intelligence Community since its inception, bringing to fruition the 
notion of a community leader independent of the individual components. The creation of 
the DNI further consolidated the power and authorities of the intelligence community into 
a single position. The DNI also replaced the DCI as the principal intelligence adviser to 
the president, and thus, inherited the role of speaking on behalf of the IC and serving as 
the primary representative of the IC to the president.79 As a result, one possible 
conclusion is that the relationship between the DNI and the president is representative of 
the relationship the president enjoys with the IC as a whole.  
C. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP 
As the reforms of the Intelligence Community occurred—consolidating or 
expanding the responsibilities of various agencies, and technological advances changed 
methods for collecting information—the membership of the intelligence community also 
changed. This section will briefly discuss the current members of the intelligence 
community to include their foundations, component evolution, incorporation into the IC, 
and basic responsibilities.  
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As it stands today, the Intelligence Community is comprised of 17 components 
that are organized into two independent agencies, eight DOD elements, and 
representation from seven other departments and agencies, all of which fall under the 
DNI and his Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).80 The two 
independent agencies are the CIA and the ODNI.81 The CIA’s primary responsivity is to 
provide intelligence regarding national intelligence to the executive and congressional 
intelligence committees.82 The CIA is also the primary manager for human intelligence, 
so the director serves as the National Human Source Intelligence manager.83 ODNI’s 
primary mission is to lead the IC and to deliver the most insightful intelligence possible, 
but it also contains compartments dedicated to national intelligence concerns such as 
counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and cyber threats.84 The 
DCI and DNI were or are the leaders of the organizations in this section, so the CIA is the 
primary component of the IC being studied in this thesis while headed by the DCI, with 
the DNI’s ODNI being the organization in focus for all cases post 9/11.  
Although not the focus of this study, the Department of Defense elements fall 
under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). While subservient to the intelligence 
requirements promulgated by the DNI, those elements are in place primarily to support 
the senior members in the DOD. DOD elements include Army intelligence, Navy 
intelligence, Marine Corps intelligence, Air Force intelligence, Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National 
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Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Security Agency (NSA).85 The other 
intelligence community members include representatives from the Department of State, 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, Department of Treasury, Drug 
Enforcement Agency, FBI, and Coast Guard intelligence,86 
The ODNI defines the Intelligence Community as “a federation of executive 
branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct 
intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of 
national security of the United States.”87 The ODNI’s definition reinforces the notion that 
the IC, led by the DNI, is responsible primarily for serving the president.  
D. THE PRESIDENT’S INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTION 
For the Intelligence Community to be successful, accurate and timely information 
must be communicated to a policymaker who is receptive to the information. The 
DCI/DNI is obligated ensure the president, and others, receive the intelligence support 
required, but to do so, he must receive guidance on how and what information the 
president needs or to which he will be receptive. This section will examine a few of the 
methods available for the IC to provide the president information and receive feedback 
that will be used later in the thesis to evaluate the relationship between the parties.  
1. In–Person Briefings 
Upon the passing of President Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman inherited the 
presidency after less than twelve weeks of experience as vice president. During that short 
period of time, Truman had had only limited contact with Roosevelt and little had been 
done to prepare him for the momentous task of serving as president.88 As a result, 
President Truman had no knowledge of the Manhattan Project or Roosevelt’s post-war 
plans; he walked into the White House completely ignorant of nearly all classified issues 
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because President Roosevelt did not think it pertinent that his vice president be informed 
of intelligence matters.89 With the advent of the atomic bomb and beginning of the Cold 
War, Truman did not want his successor to be as blindsided as Truman himself was upon 
entering office. As a result, President Truman authorized classified briefings for 
Republican and Democratic presidential nominees, a tradition that has continued to this 
day.90  
In-person briefings remain a method for portraying relevant intelligence to the 
president with several advantages. In person briefings allow the briefer receive immediate 
feedback by gauging president’s interest in the material being provided. It also provides a 
mechanism for answering the president’s questions regarding the material and protects 
the most sensitive information by preventing distribution. Face-to-face interactions 
between the president and the DNI/DCI are also important in establishing a relationship, 
whether good or bad. For example, as will be further studied, President Kennedy had 
negative impressions of DCI Dulles, feeling as though Dulles was patronizing and that 
his briefings lacked depth which in turn limited the access Dulles had to President 
Kennedy leading up to the Bay of Pigs disaster.91 From the start, President George W. 
Bush, on the other hand, used his briefings to dive deeper into the material and was very 
interactive providing the IC lots of feedback on the quality and content of the material 
they were providing to the president, helping to establish a supportive, positive 
relationship.92 
2. The President’s Daily Brief  
The PDB is a DNI-produced, all-source intelligence document, delivered daily to 
the president, and a presidentially-approved distribution list. It headlines the most 
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important intelligence issues and traces its origin to the early 1960s.93 Daily intelligence 
products have been delivered to the president since President Truman was in office 
receiving the Daily Summary, but the development of the President’s Intelligence 
Checklist (PICL), which subsequently evolved into the PDB, was a remarkable 
realization in the IC that the personality of the president mattered for successful 
communication of intelligence; that what worked for one president, would not necessarily 
work for the next—an issue that will later be examined in depth; and that intelligence 
needed to come from the community and go directly to the president without editing from 
outside the intelligence community to ensure the information remained unbiased.94  
The PDB is produced for the President of the United States as its first and primary 
customer. The content selected and analysis conducted reflects both what the IC deems as 
relevant, emerging, current intelligence, but also reflects the policy interests of the 
president. Throughout its history, Priess argues that the PDB was most useful to the 
president and IC when the president also received a briefing of the book, instead of 
reading it alone, and when the president made written comments regarding the material 
contained within as to provide feedback to the IC.95 
Many former presidents and principal advisers to the president regard the PDB as 
one of the most useful and influential documents they received, especially pertaining to 
matters of intelligence.96 Because it was customized to the needs of each president and 
represented the IC’s most important daily concerns for the president, the president’s level 
of use and receptivity to the document can serve as a gauge as to the president’s 
receptivity and overall opinion of the IC. If the president found the document useful or 
personalized and read or had the document briefed to him and his advisers daily, it 
signifies a positive relationship with the community whereas if the president found the 
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document useless, did not read the document, or make suggestions for improving the 
mechanism in which intelligence was delivered, it will signify a negative relationship 
with the community.  
3. National Security Strategy  
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document produced annually by the 
Executive Branch for Congress, required to be submitted on the same day as the budget 
for the next fiscal year.97 According to the Gold-Water Nichols Act, the NSS should 
outline vital interests to the U.S. government, identify resources and “capabilities 
necessary to deter aggression and implement the national security strategy,” address the 
adequacy of U.S. capabilities to execute the national strategy, and propose how to best 
employ instruments of national power to achieve the national strategy.98 Although the 
NSS is not a method for the IC to communicate with the president, it does serve to alert 
the IC as to what the president perceives as a vital interest provides direction to the IC as 
to how to focus collection assets, analysis, and reporting to best support the president. 
Although the NSS is an immensely important document for national security and foreign 
policy, it is not heavily influential in the relationship between the IC and president and 
will not be evaluated in this study.  
4. National Intelligence Estimates  
National Intelligence Estimates represent the most developed strategic assessment 
the Intelligence Community has on a subject and have historically been produced by the 
CIA. After the Dulles Report’s revelation that the CIA had been failing in producing 
quality national intelligence, DCI Smith formed the Board of National Estimates with the 
responsibility of producing the National Intelligence Estimates.99 Although NIEs are the 
most formal assessments the IC has to offer, the assessments tend to provide in-depth 
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analysis of longstanding, complex issues with strategic implications and have not been 
viewed as particularly useful in day-to-day policy decisions.100 As a result, they are not 
regularly produced, and therefore, will not be used to as an indicator of the quality of 
relationship between the president and the IC. The NIEs impacts on the credibility of the 
intelligence community and subsequent fallout, however, will be discussed in a later 
chapter as it pertained to the relationship between President George W. Bush and the IC.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The history and reforms of the Intelligence Community are instrumental in 
understanding why the relationship between the DCI/DNI and president is representative 
of the relationship the president has with the Intelligence Community as a whole. Each 
reform consolidated reporting and power within the DCI, culminating with passage of the 
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 which implemented Schlesinger’s 
1971 recommendation of appointing a community director responsible for oversight, 
direction, budgeting, and ultimately responsible for ensuring that the highest quality, all-
source intelligence reaches the president. Because the DCI/DNI is the principal 
intelligence adviser to the executive, the relationship between the IC and the president 
will be evaluated based on the relationship the president had with his DNI/DCI.  
Like the DCI was, the DNI is a presidentially-appointed position. This means that 
the appointee should be able to establish trust and rapport with the president, thus 
enabling a fruitful relationship. As this study will show, however, no president since 
Dwight Eisenhower has been served by only one DCI/DNI, indicating that the 
establishment of trust in IC leadership is not based strictly on the ability to present 
intelligence assessments to the president and that personalities matter.  
Second only to face-to-face briefs, the PDB has proven to be the most reliable 
method of communication between the president and Intelligence Community, especially 
during times when the DCI and National Security Council staff avoided interring with its 
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analysis and content. As a result, the attitude with which the president received PDB also 
serves as an indicator as to the president’s opinion of the IC, providing yet another 
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III. JOHN F. KENNEDY’S FAILURES AND SUCCESSES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
President John Kennedy’s time in office offers the most informative and 
interesting perspective on the significance of the relationship between the IC and the 
president because the relationship underwent a full reform following a massive failure 
suffered early in his presidency. Kennedy’s presidency also demonstrates what can 
happen when the IC, through the DCI/DNI, recognizes and adjusts to differing 
presidential personalities. Finally, the relationship between DCI Allen Dulles and John F. 
Kennedy provides insight into characteristics of a DCI/DNI that impede communication 
and the formation of a productive working relationship.   
This chapter will explore the relationship between President Kennedy and the 
Intelligence Community, the impact that relationship had on the infamous Bay of Pigs 
failure, and changes that were made as a result of the failure. Furthermore, this chapter 
will examine the importance of addressing changes in people with differing personalities 
to establish effective communication necessary for the IC to have a supportive 
relationship with the President. In examining Kennedy’s presidency, this chapter will 
answer the following questions proposed in Chapter I: Does a poor relationship between 
the president and IC contribute to intelligence and operational failures? Will a failure lead 
to changes in the relationship? Finally, does a positive relationship contribute to 
intelligence and operational successes? When the relationship between Kennedy and the 
IC suffered, the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs occurred; however, as the relationship 
improved, Kennedy and his team were able to successfully resolve one of the tensest 
situations in history, the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
B. KENNEDY’S EARLY RELATIONSHIP 
As this section will demonstrate in detail, President Kennedy began forming his 
relationship with the Intelligence Community within days of being named the 1960 
Democratic presidential nominee. Initially, it appeared as though Kennedy would develop 
a strong relationship with the IC, but that illusion was quickly dispelled and a poor 
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relationship ensued, providing a contributing factor to a massive failure. The conditions 
for an effective relationship, mainly communication and receptivity to information, 
appeared to be present following Kennedy’s acceptance of the Democrats’ nomination. 
As he progressed through campaigning, transition, and early presidency, Kennedy 
appeared to place a low priority on foreign intelligence, and as a result, was less receptive 
to information, so communication dropped off. Furthermore, DCI Allen Dulles and 
President Kennedy did not trust each other, leading to conditions in which the IC did not 
provide necessary support to the president. The poor relationship proved to be one of 
many factors contributing to the failure of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs.  
Professor and Special Assistant to the President (Kennedy) for Latin American 
Affairs Arthur Schlesinger and CIA Inspector General John Helgerson are the primary 
sources for establishing Kennedy’s early relationship with the Intelligence Community. It 
is important to understand the bias that each author held as he approached his work. 
Schlesinger worked closely with Kennedy from candidacy through his presidency. As a 
result, Schlesinger tended to shield Kennedy from blame and spin Kennedy’s actions in a 
positive light. Helgerson, on the other hand, was a career CIA officer. Helgerson 
acknowledged some IC fault for failures, but was also quick to point out how other 
parties contributed to the failure. These biases were recognized and accounted for in 
researching and reporting on Kennedy’s early relationship with the IC.  
1. From Nomination to Election: The Souring Relationship 
Democratic Presidential Nominee Kennedy began developing his relationship 
with President Eisenhower’s Intelligence Community when Eisenhower opted to 
continue President Truman’s practice of allowing the Central Intelligence Agency to brief 
the presidential candidates.101 Following Kennedy’s nomination President Eisenhower 
immediately reached out to Kennedy to offer classified briefings. Kennedy was quick to 
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accept. Only five days after his nomination, Kennedy received his first briefing. During 
the briefing, he was exposed to classified information, to include covert operations 
in progress or in planning.102 Being so quick to accept the invitation for briefings 
was an indication that Kennedy would be receptive to intelligence reporting, facilitating 
communication that could serve as a solid base for a strong working relationship 
with the IC.  
Kennedy’s first briefing lasted over two hours, and at its conclusion, Kennedy 
offered insight into the support he would want as president by requesting that Dulles 
cover potential trouble spots in the world in follow-on briefings.103 Once again, it 
appeared as though Kennedy was making an effort to establish a good working 
relationship with the DCI. Based on Dulles’s records of the briefing, Kennedy appeared 
to be inquisitive and attentive to the information being provided, asking questions about 
possible developments that might arise.104 The fact that Kennedy asked questions about 
future problem areas and asked to be updated on them during subsequent briefings 
indicates that Kennedy had faith in and trusted the judgements of the IC; however, 
scheduling issues and revelations of classified information during public debates soon 
soured the promising relationship.  
Kennedy received his first brief July 23, 1960, leaving a positive impression with 
Dulles about the candidate’s receptivity to intelligence. Through no fault of Dulles, 
Kennedy’s next brief would not come until September 19, 1960, and that brief 
established more realistic expectations of how Kennedy would interact with the IC early 
in his presidency. During this time, elder statesman Adlai Stevenson II reminded 
Kennedy that, if elected, Kennedy would need to be brought up to speed quickly on 
foreign policy, as Kennedy had been engrossed in domestic politics during the 
campaign.105 Instead of reaching out to the DCI, however, Kennedy commissioned 
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Stevenson to prepare a brief to update Kennedy on foreign policy. Kennedy’s decision to 
use Stevenson demonstrated a growing distance between Kennedy and the IC. Stevenson, 
while savvy about foreign policy, was not as well informed on foreign intelligence—
which forms the basis for foreign policy—as the DCI. 
On September 17, 1960, Kennedy’s staff reached out to Dulles and requested that 
he prepare a brief for Kennedy to be delivered at Kennedy’s Georgetown home on 
September 19.106 The hastily prepared briefing would be Kennedy’s second and last pre-
election brief delivered by the DCI. When Dulles arrived for the brief, Kennedy had other 
visitors to tend to as well, resulting in only thirty minutes being allotted to the DCI.107 
The lack of time allotted for the briefing and the time between briefs created the 
impression that Kennedy did not place a high value on intelligence briefings. The 
minimal time to prepare the brief, on Sunday, September 18, followed by condensing the 
scheduled briefing time likely negatively impacted Dulles’s feelings for the Democratic 
nominee. As that briefing concluded, Kennedy once again requested that he be informed 
of any trouble spots in the world, a request that Dulles never acted on. In late October 
1960, a month later, with the election rapidly approaching, the information was requested 
again, but this time to acting DCI Charles Cabell, bringing about a response within 24 
hours.108 The lack of DCI Dulles’s receptivity to the presidential nominee’s request 
further demonstrates the strained relationship between the IC and Kennedy, even before 
his election.  
Questions also arose following the presidential debates about Kennedy’s ability to 
protect classified information, which fostered distrust between the candidate and the 
Intelligence Community. During the campaign, Kennedy had appeared weak on 
Communism because he called for an apology for the U2 flight in which Gary Powers 
was shot down. Nixon then accused Kennedy of being unwilling to defend small, 
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Nationalist-held islands off the coast of China.109 As a result, Kennedy’s speechwriter, 
Richard Goodwin, without showing the statement to Kennedy, drafted a press release 
about supporting anti-Castro Cuban exiles efforts to overthrow Castro.110 Nixon asserted 
that he and Kennedy both knew that a top secret plan concerning the matter was already 
underway, which forced Nixon to take an opposite stand the following day at the fourth 
televised debate. During the debate, Nixon called Kennedy’s press release regarding 
action in Cuba, “the most dangerously irresponsible recommendations that he has made 
during the course of the campaign.”111 Schlesinger, however, maintains that the 
statement was released as no more than “rhetorical flourish” in an effort to make 
Kennedy appear hard on Communist expansion before Kennedy and his staff had any 
knowledge of the covert plans underway.112 Theodore Sorensen stated that he was certain 
Kennedy had not yet been briefed on the plans prior to the release of the statement., 
adding, “his reference to more assertive action regarding Cuba was put in by one of my 
assistants to give him something to say.”113 None of Dulles’s records from his briefings 
to Kennedy indicated that Kennedy had been briefed on the covert actions regarding 
Cuba.114 The public release of an ongoing covert action program, however, raised 
questions about what Dulles briefed Kennedy and raised questions about the security of 
the information that is presented to a presidential candidate. In fact, as a result of 
Kennedy’s statements, subsequent presidential candidate briefings have lacked 
information on covert action programs and human-source collection programs until 
after the candidate has been elected.115 The fact that these questions were raised indicates 
that the DCI was no longer comfortable providing requested support to Kennedy. 
That loss of communication between the IC and presidential candidate further 
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demonstrates the fractured relationship between the presidential candidate and DCI 
instructed to support him. 
While Kennedy’s relationship with the Intelligence Community started with 
potential, his delay in requesting additional briefings, the time allotted to the briefings, 
and possibly, the way he handled the material that was briefed all contributed to 
suboptimal conditions for an effective working relationship as the 1960 presidential 
election approached.  
Although Kennedy was responsible for a portion of the fractured relationship, 
culpability also falls on Dulles. Dulles failed to oblige Kennedy’s later requests, and as 
will be further explored, failed to support Kennedy as president-elect and president 
because Dulles did not adapt to Kennedy’s personality and habits. As an intelligence 
professional, Dulles failed to provide timely, accurate, amplifying information to 
Kennedy in a manner that Kennedy could digest, leaving Kennedy uninformed.  
2. President-Elect Kennedy 
On November 8, 1960, John Kennedy went from being the hopeful Democratic 
nominee for president to president-elect. DCI Allen Dulles realized the importance of 
repairing the estranged relationship that had developed between them and sought to make 
improvements. Kennedy, however, lost interest in establishing or maintaining positive 
ties, further contributing to the ineffective relationship which was characterized by 
incompatible personalities, lack of effective communication, and the perpetuation of the 
impression that intelligence was a low priority for the president-elect.  
President-elect Kennedy and DCI Dulles had incompatible personalities. 
Although he was no fan of Dulles, Kennedy chose to keep him in the position, but for the 
wrong reasons.116 Instead of keeping Dulles as DCI because Kennedy trusted and 
respected Dulles’s ability to do his job, Kennedy reappointed Dulles because Dulles was 
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still a national icon.117 Kennedy believed firing him would have a significant political 
cost, whereas, leaving Dulles as DCI would earn Kennedy support from Dulles’s 
admirers around the nation.118 This illustrates President-elect Kennedy’s continued lack 
of desire to establish a fruitful, working relationship with the IC. Instead of appointing a 
person in whom he trusted and would communicate with, Kennedy left Dulles in the job 
as part of a political strategy, despite their incompatible personalities. In fact, senior 
agency officials and Kennedy’s speechwriter, Ted Sorensen, would later report that 
Dulles may have patronized Kennedy during the early briefings, and that Kennedy was 
not very impressed with the briefings provided by Dulles because they lacked depth and 
did not provide any information beyond what Kennedy could read in the newspapers.119  
President-elect Kennedy’s failure to provide guidance during his first briefing 
about the Central Intelligence Agency’s plans for Cuba also demonstrates his ineffective 
relationship with the Intelligence Community based on a lack of communication. Shortly 
after the election, DCI Allen Dulles and Deputy Director for Plans (operations) Richard 
Bissel provided Kennedy an in depth briefing of covert actions regarding Cuba. Bissel 
later reported that Kennedy was predominantly a listener during this brief, asking very 
few questions, and revealing no opinions for the operation underway.120 Because 
Kennedy did not provide suggestions, guidance, or insight into his political agenda 
regarding Cuba throughout the brief, Dulles and Bissel were unable to ascertain whether 
or not he supported ongoing efforts, leaving them uninformed as to how to proceed with 
planning. Without communication or direction from Kennedy, Bissel and Dulles assumed 
the president-elect viewed the plan favorably and continued the program of training 
exiles and developing dissident groups in Cuba. The lack of communication at this 
briefing directly impacted the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion.  
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Whether intentional or not, President-Elect Kennedy’s further actions continued 
to create the appearance that intelligence was not a high priority. These actions included a 
cancelled visit to the CIA headquarters and his reappointment of Dulles as DCI. Kennedy 
was the first president-elect to request to visit the CIA since its creation.121 Dulles and 
eight other senior officers developed an ambitious agenda for the visit, containing briefs 
on the CIA’s creation, mission, organization, and explanations of key directorates to 
include clandestine collections and covert activities.122 Due to scheduling difficulties, the 
December 16 visit was cancelled, and Kennedy was unable to visit until after his 
inauguration on January 26. Even then, briefing during his one-and-a-half-hour visit was 
cut short because Kennedy chose to dedicate time to reading letters loaned by his alma 
matter that were part of an exhibit the Agency had put up a few weeks earlier.123 
Helgerson did not elaborate on the scheduling difficulty that prevented the December 16 
visit to the CIA headquarters, but the president-elect was photographed in his 
Georgetown home with Alaska Senators E.L. Bartlett and Ernest Gruening.124 Kennedy’s 
cancellation of the visit during the transition period, and his decision to spend time 
reading an exhibit instead of attending briefings when he finally did visit the CIA 
headquarters demonstrated that the newly elected and inaugurated president did not place 
a high priority on the importance or functions of the CIA, furthering the suboptimal 
relationship between the IC and the president. Additionally, the decision to keep Dulles 
on as DCI indicated that President-elect Kennedy did not place a high value on 
intelligence because he did not care for Dulles, yet he left Dulles at the head of the IC.  
3. Post-inauguration 
Up to inauguration, President-elect John Kennedy was reliant upon President 
Eisenhower’s Intelligence Community because Kennedy could not make changes to the 
structure, personnel, or information received during the lame duck period. After his 
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inauguration, however, President Kennedy was free to, but did not, make changes to how 
he was briefed or by whom, even though Eisenhower’s team and style did not suit 
Kennedy’s personality, which further degraded the relationship he shared with the IC.  
Eisenhower demanded structured and scheduled briefings whereas Kennedy 
disliked the bureaucracy associated with government and preferred more of an ad hoc 
briefing. For the duration of his presidency, Eisenhower preferred to receive intelligence 
in the form of weekly, formal briefs to himself and the National Security Council (NSC), 
presented by DCI Dulles, which allowed all the key players in policy decisions to discuss 
the same intelligence in policy formation.125 This resulted in great communication and 
feedback between Eisenhower and the IC. It also ensured the IC was informed of policy 
concerns, allowing the IC to tailor its reporting based on the needs of the NSC and 
president which helped form a supportive relationship between IC and president 
Eisenhower. Kennedy, on the other hand, saw Eisenhower’s NSC as a bureaucratic 
monster that was an impediment to the free flow of ideas and formation of policy, so he 
directed his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, to trim the NSC into a flexible 
organization capable of squarely confronting real policy decisions.126 Priess elaborates on 
the difference in styles, stating that Kennedy “adopted an improvisational style built 
around informal conversations,” that more closely resembled a “‘pickup game of football 
crossed with a Harvard seminar.’”127 Even with the condensed NSC, the NSC 
encountered a core problem in trying to support Kennedy: Kennedy’s short attention span 
made it nearly impossible to keep the president engaged in national security discussions 
to the point that Kennedy got up and walked out the first time NSC Executive Secretary 
Bromley Smith gave a formal brief.128 This vast difference in styles exacerbated the poor 
relationship between Kennedy and the IC because, without communication, the IC was 
unable to ascertain the needs of the president. Meanwhile, the president was losing 
patience with the IC because, in his eyes, they were not providing any more information 
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than he could obtain reading the morning newspapers.129 Additionally, while discussing 
Kennedy’s core advisors and the NSC, Schlesinger never mentions DCI Dulles or any 
representatives of the IC, highlighting both the low priority Kennedy placed on foreign 
intelligence and the poor status of the relationship he shared with the IC.  
Personal chemistry was lacking and a significant age gap existed between 
President Kennedy and DCI Dulles. According to Helgerson, Dulles continuously 
attempted traditional methods of sharing intelligence with President Kennedy; however, 
as discussed above, President Kennedy was not a fan of traditional, bureaucratic methods 
such as lengthy, wordy memos or long, traditional briefs. Dulles’s ability to brief 
President Kennedy was limited because, unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy did not hold 
regular NSC meetings. Because briefing opportunities were few, when Dulles wanted to 
express urgent information or important national estimates to President Kennedy, Dulles 
would draft long memorandums and try to personally deliver them to Kennedy. 
Kennedy, however, did not find value in the memos, leading to a more estranged 
relationship with the DCI, nearly devoid of communication, which set the stage for the 
failure at the Bay of Pigs.130  
Upon being elected, Kennedy began receiving the same daily products as 
President Eisenhower had. Eisenhower granted his request, but it was more information 
than Kennedy expected. Helgerson notes that Kennedy began each day reading five or six 
newspapers before getting out of bed. Kennedy would then receive the CIA’s Current 
Intelligence Bulletin in a large package that contained other material as well. Because the 
packet of products was so abundant, much of it remained unread.131 Kennedy’s military 
aide Ted Clifton urged the CIA to cut down the material to a double-spaced two pages, 
free of bureaucratic prose because, although it worked for Eisenhower, Kennedy did not 
have the patience to work through the thick booklet of briefing papers.132 Kennedy’s 
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decision not to alter how he received material or what material he received, despite his 
vastly different personality from Eisenhower, resulted in an IC that was unable to 
effectively support the president. As will be shown in the next section, this resulted in 
Kennedy being less informed than he should have been going into the execution of the 
Bay of Pigs invasion.  
Kennedy’s early interactions with the Intelligence Community demonstrates the 
importance of personnel and communication in establishing a good relationship with the 
Intelligence Community. Kennedy reappointed Dulles as DCI even though they clearly 
had incompatible personalities which prevented Kennedy from fully incorporating Dulles 
into Kennedy’s system. Furthermore, Kennedy’s decision to keep Eisenhower’s products 
without maintaining the structured briefings resulted in Kennedy not receiving effective 
support from the IC. Overall, although the relationship started with potential during the 
campaign, going into April 1961, a poor relationship that was nearly absent of 
communication, existed between President Kennedy and the IC.   
C. THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO 
The poor relationship between President Kennedy and DCI Dulles, in the form of 
minimal communication and differing personalities, negatively impacted the outcome of 
the 1961 attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs. From the first brief though the 
operation’s commencement, Kennedy failed to communicate his policy concerns, 
objectives, or intentions to Dulles. Dulles, likewise, failed to adapt to Kennedy’s 
presidential style to learn Kennedy’s political objectives, resulting in his inability to 
support those objectives. Instead, Dulles pushed his own objectives by strongly 
advocating for the invasion which obscured his ability to remain objective about the best 
course of action or likelihood of success for the intended operation. Leading up to the 
operation’s execution, failure to communicate coupled with differing personalities 
resulted in the formation of faulty assumptions, by both Kennedy and Dulles, and 
fostered an environment in which key advisers were unwilling to speak out against the 
plan. These effects of the poor relationship manifested during the operation and 
contributed to the overall failure.  
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1. Briefings Leading up to the Operation 
According to Helgerson, on November 18, 1960, only ten days after the election, 
DCI Dulles and Bissel provided Kennedy his first full brief on the covert actions 
targeting Castro, as the plans existed at the time. In briefing the president-elect on options 
for Cuba, Bissell and Dulles sought only to inform him of the authorizations they had 
received under Eisenhower, how preparations were progressing, and outlined three 
phases of paramilitary action in Cuba: the first phase, already underway, focused on the 
training and development of anti-Castro dissident groups to conduct guerrilla operations 
in Cuba; the second potential phase was for trained, exiled Cubans to conduct a combined 
sea and air assault with emphasis placed on timing and numbers of men and equipment; 
the third possible phase was overt U.S. air support for the exiles and guerrilla forces as 
they approached Havana. The briefers intended to make clear to Kennedy that guerrilla 
forces would not be enough by themselves to incite revolt and overthrow Castro; 
however, it is unclear whether they provided the more pessimistic assessment that the 
operation would fail without direct U.S. involvement. Kennedy listened carefully to the 
briefing, and although he later made multiple inquiries about the possibilities of success, 
at this brief he did not ask many questions or provide insight into his intentions for Cuba 
policy once inaugurated.133 This first briefing illuminates the importance of 
communication. Had Dulles and Bissel effectively communicated the necessity for overt 
U.S. support to the guerrillas, Kennedy may have been more apt to provide guidance as to 
how he would like to proceed once inaugurated, or Kennedy could have freely 
volunteered that information so the CIA planners could proceed in a course that would 
appease the incumbent as well as the incoming president. Instead, the previously-formed, 
estranged relationship prohibited free, open, honest communication between the 
individuals.  
The poor communication at the first briefing contributed to the project to taking 
on a life of its own before Kennedy could be briefed again. On November 29, 1960, DCI 
Dulles met with President Eisenhower to update him on the progress of plans for Cuba, 
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during which, Eisenhower urged Dulles to actively pursue plans for the project.134 With 
those orders and a feeling of general approval from the first briefing with Kennedy, 
Dulles and Bissel proceeded planning, nearly unchecked, throughout the transition 
period.  
During this period, the Central Intelligence Agency exceeded its original 
authorizations to build a covert army of Cuban exiles trained to conduct guerrilla warfare 
in Cuba while maintaining U.S. plausible deniability.135 Schlesinger notes that the 
original plan, that dictated multiple infiltrations of small groups of anti-Castro guerrillas 
to conduct sabotage and incite civil unrest, was scrapped. Instead, the American 
lieutenant colonel responsible for training guerrillas in Guatemala expressed his concern 
that the force currently in training was too small to militarily overthrow Castro and 
pushed for expanded recruitment. This resulted in bringing in former supporters of 
Batista and former members of Batista’s military.136 This led to disgruntlement, and 
nearly an open rebellion, between the pro-Batista and anti-Batista groups already in 
Guatemala. It also resulted in the resignation of nearly a hundred key members that 
opposed the former Batista supporters joining the guerrilla army. The lower morale and 
lack of cohesiveness was never reported back to Washington, and preparations and 
training for the amphibious invasion continued.137 Once again, Bissel and Dulles only 
proceeded as ambitiously as they did because they were under the impression that 
President-elect Kennedy supported the plan to overthrow Castro at all costs. Had 
Kennedy voiced concern at the earlier meeting regarding attribution to the U.S. or direct 
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U.S. involvement, Bissel and Dulles could have proceeded in a manner more likely to 
succeed under the new administration.  
President Kennedy convened the first meeting regarding the plans for Cuba on 
January 28, 1961.138 According to Schlesinger, this meeting came six days after DCI 
Dulles and General Lemnitzer, speaking on behalf of the JCS, introduced the plan to key 
members of Kennedy’s administration. The CIA’s plan at the time of Kennedy’s meeting 
involved Cuban exiles, being trained in Guatemala by U.S. forces, invading Cuba to 
overthrow Castro, followed by a group of Cuban politicians favorable to the U.S. being 
flown from Florida to Cuba to run the country. At the brief, Kennedy remained skeptical 
and did not offer much of a reaction. Instead, Kennedy instructed the Defense 
Department to evaluate the feasibility of the CIA’s military concepts and the State 
Department to develop method of economically isolating Cuba with the assistance of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).139 Most importantly, however, President 
Kennedy reemphasized the ground rule that the plan must exclude overt U.S. 
involvement. The JCS reviewed the plan calling for the amphibious landing near 
Trinidad, Cuba,140 and concluded that the plan had a fair chance of success; however that 
assessment excluded an earlier note that the plan would only succeed with a sizable 
uprising on the island or external support.141 By the time the failed invasion commenced, 
all of Kennedy’s key advisers, the JCS, and high ranking officials within the CIA were all 
apprised of the plan. Despite reservations in each group, nobody voiced their concerns to 
the president. The reports that did forecast the failure, such as the memo from the 
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Defense Department noting the necessity of external assistance or the CIA’s intelligence 
estimate concluding that Cubans were unlikely to rebel, never reached the president for 
consideration. These instances of miscommunication leading up to the commencement 
of the failed invasion demonstrate the impact the poor relationship had during the 
planning phase.  
2. Faulty Assumptions and Micro-Managerial Planning 
After months of the Central Intelligence Agency’s free reign during the transition 
period, as the operation’s date of execution approached, President Kennedy took an 
active managerial role in the planning. That coupled Dulles’s inaccurate statements 
regarding Cuban popular sentiment, Castro’s military strength, the capabilities of the 
paramilitary force, and Kennedy’s willingness to commit U.S. forces to ensure success, 
doomed the operation and resulted in catastrophic failure. At the heart of these issues was 
the continued miscommunication between the president and the DCI because, as Warner 
states in regards to planning, “they assumed they spoke the same language with regard to 
Cuba, but they actually were imprisoned by mutually exclusive misconceptions about the 
invasions likely outcome.”142 
As the Bay of Pigs invasion operation approached, President Kennedy took a 
more active role in planning the operation with the intent to limit American culpability by 
changing the landing point and authorizations for military support. Based on the National 
Security Archive’s chronology of events, at a meeting on March 11, 1961, Bissell 
presented the plan involving a combined amphibious and airborne assault to seize and 
hold a beachhead near Trinidad, Cuba. Kennedy, however, rejected the plan as too 
spectacular. As a result, Bissell was left searching for a new beach to seize and settled on 
the Zapata plan that called for a smaller invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy then made 
additional modifications to give the illusion that rebellion was an inside guerrilla type 
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operation.143 The JCS reviewed these modifications and concluded that they were 
unlikely to have the same chance of success as an invasion at Trinidad. Furthermore, 
Dulles and Bissell were aware that the changes reduced the chance of success, but the 
lack of communication and their blind support for the policy, prevented them from 
voicing concerns to the president. This demonstrates the importance of communication 
and a positive relationship because, had the DCI better understood the president and his 
hesitancy to risk U.S. troops, he may have been more willing to voice concerns regarding 
the chance of success. Instead, Dulles continued to push the plan. 
Although DCI Dulles was aware that the landing of the exiles would not set off a 
spontaneous uprising, he also knew that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and president’s approval 
of the plan hinged on the belief of an uprising. According to Schlesinger, the president 
and JCS assumed that a successful occupation would encourage the organized, armed 
Cuban resistance fighters to rebel.144 When questioned about the possibilities of an 
uprising in early April, instead of communicating the CIA assessment discounting the 
possibility of an uprising, Dulles and Bissel stated that the internal resistance had 2500 
members, sympathizers numbered near 20,000, and the exiles, once established on the 
beachhead, could expect active assistance from nearly a quarter of the Cuban 
population.145  
This intentionally deceptive statement illuminates two key factors regarding the 
relationship between President Kennedy and Director Dulles: first, it shows the 
importance of having a non-political DCI focused on supporting the president instead of a 
DCI focused on a specific policy action. As noted in Kirkpatrick’s IG Survey, “there was 
failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering scrutiny on the project and to 
apply experienced, unbiased judgement to the menacing situations that developed.”146 
Dulles was so focused on ensuring the operation was executed that he failed to provide an 
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honest assessment of its chance for success. In fact, Dulles emphasized that executing the 
operation was the only method of ending it because if Kennedy chose not to go through 
with it, they would have to address the problem of disbanding the trained exiles in 
Guatemala.147 Second, it demonstrates the importance of trust and honest communication 
in the relationship. Kennedy was more and more hesitant to go through with the operation 
as the execution date approached, but never communicated his hesitancy to Dulles. As a 
result, Dulles felt as though President Kennedy was fully committed to seeing the 
operation succeed under any circumstances. In fact, one of the key general assumptions 
of the plan was that Kennedy would authorize the landing of Marines to finish Castro if 
the exile brigade appeared to be failing.148 This faulty assumption on the basis of poor 
communication resulted in Dulles exaggerating the chances of operational success 
because he was counting on Kennedy’s willingness to commit troops. A better 
relationship with honest communication would have alleviated these faulty assumptions, 
and the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs could have been successful or not attempted.  
3. Execution and Fallout 
With regard to Cuba, President Kennedy entered the office at a disadvantage. 
Instead of being able to explore multiple courses of action, decide upon, and execute the 
one that best suited his policy agenda, he had the choice to invade Cuba or not because 
Eisenhower’s plan had already been devoted copious resources and time.149 Furthermore, 
Bissel and Dulles were actively advocating for the plan in development, and, as far as 
Kennedy knew, the JCS were in agreement that it was an effective course of action. As a 
result, Kennedy, despite personal concerns, ordered the invasion of Cuba on April 17, 
1961, bowing to pressure from the president of Guatemala and CIA.150  
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The events of the invasion are summarized in Schlesinger’s work as well as 
Kirkpatrick’s survey, with very few differences. An airstrike scheduled for the night of 
April 16 was unable to launch due heavy haze over the airfield, preventing the 
destruction of Castro’s air force, but at this point, it was too late to stop the invasion 
force.151 Cuban underwater demolitions teams landed on two of the three beaches chosen 
for the invasion in the early morning hours of April 17 to mark the beaches for the main 
invasion force. As they landed, they were almost immediately engaged by Castro’s 
militia. The underwater demolitions teams were able to quickly defeat the militiamen, but 
not before the militia alerted the rest of Castro’s forces. This enabled the Cuban air force, 
which was more capable than previously assessed, to engage the landing forces, the naval 
support vessels, and the Cuban exiles’ B-26 air force. In doing so, Castro’s air force sank 
the supply ship carrying the ammunition reserve for the following ten days, wreaked 
havoc on the landing forces, and quickly destroyed half of the B-26s. The alert also 
allowed Castro to dispatch tanks more quickly than the invasion planners assessed to 
counter the invading forces. Despite early conflict, many of the forces made it ashore and 
fought valiantly for the next three days, inflicting heavy casualties on Castro’s forces. 
However, with the loss of the supply ship and lack of additional resources or assistance 
from the United States, the invading exiles ran out of ammunition and were forced to 
surrender or flee for their lives, ending the invasion. Those that fled were unable to cross 
the 80 miles necessary to reach the Escambray Mountains due to the swampy interior of 
the country, thus ending the opportunity for guerrilla warfare and ending the invasion. 
Furthermore, the invasion failed to spark an internal rebellion because Castro’s police 
force arrested anybody assumed to have connections to the underground to include 
200,000 people in Havana.152  
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American culpability in the failed invasion was undeniable, internationally and 
domestically. Khrushchev immediately sent a diplomatic message denouncing the 
invasion and pledging all necessary support to Castro.153 The American public was 
equally as outraged. According to Schlesinger, in an open letter to Kennedy, Harvard 
historian, H. Stuart Hughes and seventy other academicians accused Kennedy of driving 
Cuba into an even stronger alliance with the Soviet Union. Students launched protests on 
a dozen campuses across the country, and a “Fair Play for Cuba Rally” in New York 
attracted nearly three thousand people.154 Kennedy realized that the failure was 
avoidable, and took away the following lesson learned: “an intelligence failure had led to 
bad advice, which in turn prompted a bad decision.”155  
D. THE RELATIONSHIP CHANGES 
Following the failure of the operation at the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy was 
forced to reevaluate his relationship with the Intelligence Community, prompting his 
infamous comment to Bissel, “In a parliamentary government, I’d have to resign. But in 
this government I can’t, so you and Allen have to go.”156 This led to a change of 
leadership and a change in the way the president received intelligence. The 
implementation of these changes allowed for the IC to serve an integral role in the 
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The leadership change in the Intelligence Community involved the resignation of 
Dulles and Bissel and the appointment of John McCone as DCI. In appointing McCone, 
Kennedy no longer had to rely on an adviser kept on from the previous administration, 
but instead had somebody that he trusted and that fit his administration’s needs. 
According to Schlesinger, one of the major lessons Kennedy learned from the failed  
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invasion at the Bay of Pigs was that he placed too much trust in experts “whose primary  
loyalty was not to him or his administration.” Instead, he realized that he needed to use 
the people he had brought to government with him that he trusted.157 In this case, that 
meant replacing Dulles with McCone. Dulles complied with Kennedy’s resignation 
request but continued to serve until Kennedy named McCone as his successor in 
December 1961.158  
John McCone was picked as the Dulles’s successor as DCI, not based on previous 
experience with President Kennedy’s administration or the Intelligence Community, but 
for McCone’s honesty and ability to manage. Unlike President Eisenhower, Kennedy and 
his staff preferred to digest intelligence on their own, and needed “a sensible and subdued 
manager of the government’s intelligence business,” as opposed to Dulles’s 
“authoritative interpreter of the flow of intelligence,” style needed by Eisenhower.159 
McCone, a Republican from California, had the reputation of being a stubborn cold-
warrior; but with his cautious and realistic approach of Agency imitations, and the help of 
Richard Helms and Ray Cline as his deputies, McCone repaired the morale and 
reputation of the CIA. McCone was also willing to work with Kennedy’s staff to figure 
out a new way to support the president, appointing his Deputy of Current Intelligence to 
develop the product that would serve as the way forward. 
The appointment of DCI McCone marked a significant milestone in President 
Kennedy’s efforts to repair his relationship with the Intelligence Community. McCone 
was a man Kennedy trusted and a man that would have access to Kennedy, unlike Dulles. 
This face to face interaction was essential in the IC’s understanding of the president’s 
direction on foreign policy which in turn allowed them to provide unbiased information 
on those subjects to ensure the president was as informed as possible. Furthermore, 
McCone recognized that he was not the expert so McCone frequently called on the 
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experts to brief their intelligence while McCone provided objective criticism to alleviate 
biases, as will be discussed in more detail when evaluating the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
Priess provides insights into the changes in how President Kennedy received 
intelligence, unintentionally illustrating Kennedy’s recognition of the necessity for 
change and receptivity to instituting those changes. After the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs, 
National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy vented to Kennedy about the way he 
received intelligence and used his staff. In doing so, Bundy noted that it was impossible 
to get the president to sit still for more than eight minutes each morning for national 
security discussions to include an intelligence brief, and that needed to change for the 
president to be successful in forming foreign policy. He went on to recommend that the 
president set aside real, scheduled time each day for discussion and action. He also 
encouraged the president to receive an intelligence brief from a professional CIA officer 
at least three times a week.160   
Although President Kennedy did not immediately institute all of the changes 
National Security Adviser Bundy proposed, Kennedy was receptive to the feedback and 
commissioned his senior military aide Chester Clifton to find a solution. Clifton 
approached the Director of Current Intelligence, Huntington Sheldon and senior analyst 
Dick Lehman and instructed them to “produce a product with everything that required the 
president’s attention.”161 On June 15, 1961, Clifton asked Sheldon and Lehman to 
produce a short document absent of bureaucratic prose, jargon, and classification markers 
that the president could fold up and carry in his breast pocket throughout the day to read 
when he had time.162 Within 24 hours, Lehman and Sheldon developed a dry run of 
President’s Intelligence Checklist (PICL) for Clifton’s approval. Clifton signed off on 
Lehman’s product, and on June 17, 1961, the first PICL, a seven-page 8.5 by 8 inch  
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booklet consisting of 14 intelligence highlights, was delivered to President Kennedy at 
his home.163 By happenstance, Sheldon’s three superiors were out of town at the time 
which allowed him to deliver the first PICL directly to President Kennedy the next day 
without intervention or edits from his superiors.164 By the time Sheldon informed them, 
President Kennedy had already received two PICLs and was impressed with the product, 
preventing any chance of killing or changing the project.165 
The PICL was a significant change because it provided a method, to which 
Kennedy was receptive, that communicated the most sensitive, important intelligence 
highlights to the president. In addition to reading the PICL daily, it also served as a 
method for the president to provide feedback to the IC and alert them to his concerns 
because Kennedy would write comments on it and request amplifying information. 
Clifton noted that the PICL “was considered by the president as a daily communication 
between the DCI and the president’s office.”166  Because the PICL succeeded at 
delivering information to the president as well as provide feedback to the IC, it served as 
the first successful method of communication between the president and the IC.  
The improved communication and improved personal chemistry between the DCI 
and President Kennedy was made possible by Kennedy’s receptivity to change after 
being prompted by a major failure. The changes resulted in an improved working 
relationship between the IC and president, which proved important for in the fall of 1962 
when Soviet missiles were discovered in Cuba.   
E. THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE MISSILE CRISIS 
President Kennedy was once again forced to deal with Cuba when the Intelligence 
Community alerted him to the presence of Soviet military shipments to Cuba. Initially,  
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the IC, with the exception of DCI McCone, assessed that Khrushchev would only send 
defensive weapons to Cuba because the weapons were justified for Castro’s survival 
based on previous U.S. facilitated invasion and overthrow attempts.167 McCone, on the 
other hand, briefly contemplated and vocalized an assessment stating Khrushchev would 
ship offensive nuclear capabilities to Cuba as well, but not with enough conviction to 
overturn the popular opposing sentiment.168 The popular sentiment quickly changed on 
October 14, 1962 when processed U-2 photography revealed launch pads designed for 
ballistic missiles as well as a single missile on the ground in San Cristóbal.169 
While the secret arrival of missiles in Cuba was a failure of the Intelligence 
Community to collect information, the resolution of the crisis without a military strike 
was a brilliant success for President Kennedy’s administration and would not have been 
possible without support and communication from the IC. DCI McCone was an active 
participant of the Executive Committee (ExComm), had regular contact with the 
president, and used those briefings to provide the president with information without 
pushing a political agenda. The change in Kennedy’s mentality regarding the reception of 
advice was also instrumental in facilitating effective communication with all of ExComm 
to include DCI McCone. Finally, a recently declassified letter from Kennedy to the DCI 
McCone proves that Kennedy felt as though the IC was instrumental in the peaceful 
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
Improved communication between the president and Intelligence Community, and 
a strong IC presence at the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 
meetings was instrumental in the de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis when compared to the interactions that occurred during the planning of the 
Bay of Pigs Invasion. ExComm had strong intelligence representation which facilitated 
the dissemination of unbiased intelligence to ensure the committee, and ultimately  
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President Kennedy, was as informed as possible in deliberating and deciding the best 
course of action for resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition to the DCI McCone, 
Arthur Lundahl, who was Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 
and Sidney Graybeal, the Chief of the CIA’s Offensive Missile Division, routinely 
attended ExComm meetings to elaborate on collected intelligence and Soviet 
capabilities.170 This contrasts with meetings regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion in two 
notable ways: first, the DCI was not pushing policy agenda through the use of his own 
assessments even though McCone initially favored the idea of military intervention.171 
Instead, DCI McCone called in the specialists to brief their specific fields, enabling the 
IC to provide more accurate, timely, unbiased assessments because the individual 
members kept each other in check. This bolstered the trust from the remaining members 
of ExComm, to include the president, and enabled them to use the provided information 
to form and debate multiple policy options from limited diplomatic pressure to a full 
scale military invasion.172  Second, unlike the planning meetings for the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, President Kennedy questioned reporting, asked questions, and requested 
additional information. This illustrates the improvement in communication between the 
president and IC when compared to the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs because during 
those meetings, Kennedy listened but kept his reservations and questions to himself. The 
questions and requests for additional information aided the president in ruling out 
military strike options because the military and IC could not guarantee that all missile 
sites would be destroyed. Revelations in later years indicated that this was the correct call 
because the IC failed to locate or even realize the presence of tactical nuclear missiles 
that were operational before October 1962 that would have been used on invading U.S. 
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forces.173 Without that effective communication and trusting relationship, Kennedy may 
have authorized the military invasion of Cuba, possibly starting a thermo-nuclear war.  
President Kennedy was also more receptive to advice after the early failure. 
Instead of relying on single sources of assurance, Kennedy wanted everybody’s opinion. 
Robert Kennedy noted that the Cuban Missile Crisis was successfully resolved because 
ExComm had time to debate and present differing opinions and options to President 
Kennedy, whereas during the Bay of Pigs, the illusion of unanimity existed because those 
who opposed the plan did not voice their concerns.174 Additionally, prior to any action 
being taken, President Kennedy wanted to know all possible implications of the action, as 
Robert Kennedy noted, “again and again he [President Kennedy] emphasized that we 
must understand the implications of every step. What response could we anticipate? What 
were the implications for us?”175 This also contrasted sharply with the planning sessions 
leading up to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion because although many key staff members 
were apprehensive about the plan, none wanted to voice their concerns to the new 
president. President Kennedy was also apprehensive about the plan, but authorized the ill-
fated invasion to commence based on the perceived support from his advisers, whereas 
during the deliberations for the best course of action regarding Cuban missiles, Kennedy 
was insistent on hearing all objections to each plan, focusing on the second, third, and 
fourth order effects.176 
The final piece of evidence supporting the significance the change of relationship 
had in the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be seen in a letter 
President Kennedy drafted to DCI McCone following the ordeal. On January 9, 1963, 
President Kennedy had a letter delivered to DCI McCone commending the IC’s part in 
the resolution of the crisis. Of note, Kennedy remarked, “the fact that we had timely and 
accurate information, skillfully analyzed and clearly presented, to guide us in our 
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judgements during the crisis is, I believe, the greatest tribute to the effectiveness of these 
individuals and agencies.”177 This remark illustrates the value of McCone’s approach to 
presenting information to the president because, Kennedy noted the information guided 
the policymakers in their decision instead of pushing for a specific policy regarding the 
missiles in Cuba. The importance the IC played in the successful de-escalation was also 
noted when Kennedy wrote, “the magnitude of their contribution can be measured, in 
part, by the fact that the peace was sustained during a most critical time.”178  
F. ANALYSIS AND IMPACTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
“But no one can doubt that failure in Cuba in 1961 contributed to success in Cuba 
in 1962.”179 This concluding line from Schlesinger’s chapter on the Cuban Missile Crisis 
from his book A Thousand Days most accurately captures the sentiment of this thesis 
chapter. The evolution of the support the IC provided to President Kennedy clearly shows 
that a poor relationship led to a massive intelligence failure that then served as the 
catalyst to force changes, which in turn led to a great relationship and subsequent success. 
The Bay of Pigs Invasion led to the firing of DCI Dulles, appointment of John McCone, 
and reform on how President Kennedy received his intelligence. As a result, 
communication between the IC and Kennedy flourished, allowing for the successful 
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and 
planning process leading up to it also demonstrates the danger of the IC pursuing policy 
objectives instead of providing information.  
Finally, Kennedy’s presidency demonstrates that a poor early relationship does 
not have to remain poor. Dulles, the CIA, and the IC had a great relationship with 
Eisenhower, working through the NSC meetings. That was not the case with Kennedy; 
fortunately, Sheldon saved the relationship with the creation of the PICL. The IC and 
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Kennedy’s failure at the Bay of Pigs brought to light the need for a change in the 
relationship as well as the method of communication between the president and IC. 
Furthermore, President Kennedy agreed that a change needed to happen and was 
receptive to the idea. As a result of that change, Kennedy averted a nuclear war during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and “the relationship with Kennedy was not only a distinct 
improvement over the more formal relationship with Eisenhower, but would only rarely 





                                                 
180 Helgerson, Getting to Know the Presidents, 50.  
 62
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 63
IV. GEORGE H. W. BUSH: A TALE OF SUCCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
George H. W. Bush181 entered his Presidency with a better understanding of the 
role, responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations of the Intelligence Community than any 
president before him or after him, because he had served as President Ford’s DCI, from 
January 20, 1976 until March 9, 1977.182 This made him the first and only president to be 
both a producer and a consumer of the highest intelligence products in the country.183 
During his short time as DCI, Bush developed a deep understanding of the significance of 
DCI access to the president because his access enabled him to directly resolve disputes 
with Ford’s Cabinet members without being pushed around. The relationship he had with 
Ford allowed that access. Bush took this lesson to heart and, as president, applied it to his 
own DCI, William Webster. 
Whereas the previous chapter discussed the repercussions of a presidency 
beginning with a poor relationship with the Intelligence Community, this chapter 
examines the results of a president who began his term with a strong working relationship 
with the Intelligence Community. George H.W. Bush was chosen for this because, like 
John Kennedy, Bush became president while a plan was being developed to depose a 
world leader. For Kennedy, that was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion to remove Castro. 
Bush entered office during the midst of planning to oust and arrest Panamanian de facto 
ruler Manuel Noriega. Unlike Kennedy, however, Bush witnessed success in his 
operation, indicating that a positive relationship between the president and IC is more 
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likely to result in operational and intelligence successes.184 This thesis chapter will show 
that a successful operation further strengthens the relationship between the president and 
IC, which then contributed to additional successes, in the form of Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED AS DCI 
According to Priess, when President Ford asked George H.W. Bush to accept the 
DCI position, Bush was initially very hesitant. At the time of being asked, he was serving 
as the de facto ambassador to China following a two-year stint as the ambassador to the 
UN. Those two positions had sparked a desire to pursue a career in international politics. 
Additionally, Bush knew the DCI was an apolitical position, so, he thought taking the 
position would be political suicide—an outcome for which he was unprepared. In fact, 
his Senate confirmation hinged on a promise that Bush would not pursue a presidential or 
vice presidential bid in the 1976 election. Bush’s father, however, taught Bush that 
service to his country was of the highest calling. As a result, he could not turn down the 
president’s request, stating that, “if this is what the President [sic] wants me to do the 
answer is a firm ‘YES.’”185 In accepting the position, Bush placed his political career on 
hold, but service as DCI benefited him immensely later when he was elected president.  
George H. W. Bush’s tenure as DCI from January 1976 until January 1977, 
enabled him to form a strong relationship with the Intelligence Community during his 
presidency because it gave him a fundamental understanding of how the Intelligence 
Community functioned. While serving as DCI, Bush had an opportunity to become 
familiar with intelligence products. Serving as DCI also enabled him to learn the 
importance of the DCI’s access to the president and the importance of the president’s 
feedback to the IC. Finally, because he was the DCI, Bush understood the importance of 
the position, so, as president, he ensured he had the right man in the job. He took all of 
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these lessons learned from his time as DCI into the White House when he was 
inaugurated as president.  
As DCI, Bush became intimately familiar with the intelligence products available 
to the president, and, more specifically, the significance of having briefers deliver the 
PDB. Bush was not an intelligence professional, so upon taking the appointment, he 
focused on administrative aspects of the job instead of intelligence analysis.186 As a 
result, he did not contribute to, brief, or edit the PDB because he wanted to avoid the 
appearance of politicization of intelligence.187 He did, however, obtain familiarity with 
the product because he read it daily on his way to Langley, and on occasion, briefed it to 
the NSC so the president received Bush’s analysis as well.188 Furthermore, although 
daily PDB briefings had dropped off, Bush saw how important it was to have intelligence 
analysts deliver briefs to Ford at his weekly meeting with Bush because “the president 
was better off…hearing directly from the … experts than listening to him try to 
effectively convey their content.”189 This was another lesson he took with him to the 
Oval Office. According to Priess, Bush stated,” one of my favorite times of day was 
when I would sit down with a briefer and read through the PDB.”190 Bush went on to 
explain the importance of the brief: not only did the briefer provide amplifying 
information that helped Bush make decisions, it also helped the officers that worked on 
the book because they knew that their work was being read by the president every day, 
and the questions Bush asked during the briefings helped guide the writers to focus on 
what he needed, but did not yet know.191 Because he was the editor of the PDB and the  
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community manager for the IC, Bush had the chance to witness firsthand the how much 
reporting was screened and sifted through to find PDB articles. He understood how much 
work went into each edition of the PDB, and as a result, gave it, and the people that 
produced it, the respect and recognition they deserved.  
Before even accepting the DCI position, Bush realized the importance of the 
DCI’s access to the president. In fact, one of his three conditions for accepting the 
appointment was “free and direct access to the president.”192 Even though the Republican 
party was advising Ford to put distance between himself and the CIA for political 
reasons, Ford accepted and honored this agreement with Bush. The access came in the 
form of a weekly Thursday or Friday meeting in the Oval Office along with National 
Security Adviser Scowcroft, assuming the men were in DC.193 Bush viewed these 
meetings as a chance to show off the Agency’s capabilities as well as get analysts and 
experts in front of the president so they could see that their hard work was valued at the 
highest level.194 This simple action contributed significantly to the bolstering of morale 
in the CIA, which in turn, improved the quality of their output. This serves as another 
lesson learned early that he capitalized on once becoming president.  
Bush’s time as DCI gave him insight into how significant the position is and the 
importance of having a good leader with a personality compatible with the president—
lessons he took with him into the presidency. Bush was confirmed as DCI at a time when 
the IC, more specifically the CIA, was under an immense amount of congressional and 
public scrutiny for past covert operations and domestic surveillance operations. Bush had 
just accepted the position when the discussed Pike and Church Committees’ reports were 
released..195 As a result, morale was low at the agency as was public opinion of the IC. 
Bush’s strong leadership was responsible for improving morale and implementing 
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Executive Orders that increased oversight of the IC without bruising egos.196  Bush 
skillfully navigated between political tension between the IC and Congress to implement 
desired changes in oversight while maintaining the trust and respect of the IC.  
Because Bush was a strong leader that had regular access to the president, he was 
in a position to preserve CIA responsibilities and authorities in the aftermath of the Pike 
and Church committees. According to Priess, early in Bush’s time as DCI, McMahon 
approached Bush warning that the Department of State and Department of Defense began 
to encroach on Agency prerogatives. Bush immediately picked up the phone to discuss 
the matter with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. After a couple minutes of small talk, 
Bush asked Rumsfeld if he would take care of it, or if the two of them should “go see 
Jerry,” in reference to President Gerald Ford. Rumsfeld agreed to handle the matter, 
ending attempted power grabs following the damaging reports.197 This occasion further 
instilled in Bush the importance of having a DCI that is a strong leader, willing to 
confront other powerful government members, as well as the necessity of  access and a 
good relationship with the president. Furthermore, David Robarge pointed out that 
“Presidents often have had unrealistic expectations about what the Central Intelligence 
Agency can achieve operationally and analytically, and they usually did not appreciate 
hearing from their directors that the world was more complicated and uncertain than they 
had anticipated.”198 But, because Bush served as DCI, he entered the presidency with 
realistic expectations that helped him form a strong working relationship with the IC.  
Bush’s term as DCI came to an abrupt end, however, with the election and 
inauguration of President Jimmy Carter. Although Carter thought Bush handled the 
reforms at the CIA well, he thought Bush was too political and loyal to the Republican 
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party199 to serve in his administration.200 As a result, Bush resigned as DCI, and Admiral 
Stansfield Turner was sworn in on March 7, 1977.201  
C. VICE PRESIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DCI 
In addition to having previously served as DCI, Bush had the benefit of serving as 
vice president for the eight years leading up to his presidential election and inauguration. 
As vice president, Bush was well informed of ongoing plans. Additionally, following the 
abrupt death of DCI Bill Casey, Bush had the opportunity to influence President 
Reagan’s choice for Casey’s successor. Both the information obtained during his vice 
presidency and input on the selection William Webster as DCI, aided Bush in 
establishing an effective working relationship with the IC upon his inauguration as 
president.  
Immediately following the 1980 election, President Carter authorized the 
distribution of the PDB to President-elect Reagan, as well as Vice President-elect, George 
H.W. Bush. This enabled Bush to reacquaint himself with the most vital, sensitive 
reporting in the United States. Because of his time as DCI, he also knew the importance 
of having a briefer present to go through the PDB, and convinced President-elect Reagan 
to accept a briefer as well.202 This enabled Vice President Bush to become, and remain, 
apprised of foreign intelligence develops for the duration of his time as vice president. 
Priess notes that for the entire eight years of Bush’s vice presidency, he insisted on 
having a “working-level” briefer with him when he reviewed the PDB. Additionally, after 
Bush had reviewed the document, he would then head to the Oval Office to attend 
President Reagan’s briefing.203 Receiving the PDB was instrumental in Bush’s formation 
of a good relationship with the IC for a few reasons. First, it allowed him to remain up to 
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date on foreign intelligence. As a result, he was not surprised when the situation in 
Panama deteriorated, and he was involved in the initial contingency planning for Panama 
that began in 1988.204 Furthermore, Bush remained apprised of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
results of which, would have a substantial impact on his presidency.205 
The other significant impact Bush’s Vice Presidency had on the formation of his 
presidential relationship with the Intelligence Community was his advice in naming DCI 
Bill Casey’s successor. Casey’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Robert Gates, was 
Reagan’s first choice to replace Casey, however, after allegations of involvement in the 
Iran-Contra Scandal,206 Gates withdrew from the nomination.207 According to Garthoff, 
following Gates’s withdrawal, Bush recommended FBI Director William Webster to 
Reagan as a worthy DCI nominee. This was significant because Webster had a similar 
personality as Bush and approached the job of DCI in a similar way. Webster focused 
first on rebuilding the Agency’s image in the eyes of Congress and the public following 
the Iran-Contra Affair and allegations of the politicization of intelligence, just like Bush 
did following the Pike and Church Committees’ reports. Furthermore, Webster, like 
Bush, was not a career intelligence officer, and therefore, refrained from providing 
substantial inputs to the PDB, helping to alleviate politicization rumors.208 Because Bush 
had such a significant role in naming Casey’s replacement, he effectively started his 
presidency with his own nominee, which aided in the immediate establishment of a 
positive relationship with the IC. This also contrasts sharply with Kennedy, who entered 
office with a fractured relationship with a DCI loyal to another party and administration.  
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D. EARLY PRESIDENCY 
President Bush took office with a strong, working relationship with the DCI, and 
Intelligence Community as a whole, because he implemented the lessons learned from his 
time as DCI and vice president. He used face to face briefings with written feedback on 
the PDBs to ensure he had good communication with the IC. He also ensured he had a 
non-political appointee with a compatible personality as his DCI. Finally, his time as vice 
president was significant because he was apprised of covert action and contingency plans 
regarding Panama and was familiar with the progression and end of the Iran-Iraq War. 
These actions enabled him to establish an environment in which his relationship with the 
IC could flourish.  
Bush remarked that nearly every day of his presidency, he had a Central 
Intelligence Agency briefer sit with him as he read through the PDB to answer questions 
and elaborate on stories contained within. This, according to Bush, enriched his time with 
the PDB and aided him in making more informed decisions.209 This helped strengthen his 
relationship with the IC because it opened a channel of communication between the 
president and IC, providing insight into policy direction which allowed the IC to better 
support the president. Furthermore, it demonstrated to the analysts and producers that the 
president cared about their work and used it for policy decisions, which encouraged them 
to excel at their work. 
As vice president, Bush had the opportunity to push his nomination for DCI. As a 
result, when he took office, Bush was working with a known commodity. DCI Webster 
was formerly the FBI director so Bush knew that he was apolitical. Furthermore, while 
serving Reagan, Webster declined a Cabinet-level position because he wanted to ensure 
that he was not viewed as a political figure.210 As previously discussed, Webster also ran 
the IC much in the same manner as Bush, indicating very similar, compatible 
personalities. As a result, Bush entered his presidency well informed with a strong 
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baseline relationship with the IC, enabling him to succeed early in his presidency when 
facing a crisis in Panama. 
E. OPERATION JUST CAUSE 
1. Background 
The mid to late 1980s saw the problematic rise of Manuel Noriega in Panama 
following the death of Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) Brigadier General Omar 
Torrijos. Noriega’s ascension to power was ruthless, often stamping out opposition with 
violence.211 He veered Panama off its path toward democracy, and began establishing 
closer ties to Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua.212 Furthermore, he established ties with the 
Medellín drug cartel in Colombia and was responsible for aiding the cartel in smuggling 
millions of dollars’ worth of cocaine and marijuana into the United States.213  
As a result, Presidents Reagan and Bush made multiple attempts to use 
instruments of national power, short of military intervention, to remove Noriega. First, 
Reagan pleaded with Noriega to step down.214 When Noriega refused, Reagan began, and 
Bush continued, applying economic pressure on Noriega, cutting financial and military 
aid to Panama.215 Instead of forcing Noriega to step down, however, this exacerbated 
anti-American sentiments and sparked riots across the country. In addition to removing 
aid, Noriega was indicted on drug trafficking charges by federal grand juries in Tampa 
and Miami, carrying a sentence of over 100 years.216 Once again, this failed to convince 
Noriega to step down. Instead, as tensions grew, Noriega stepped up harassment of 
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U.S. forces in Panama217 and continued suppression political opposition. As Noriega 
became more defiant and non-military pressure failed to force Noriega to capitulate, 
Reagan and Bush determined that military force might be necessary and gave orders to 
commence planning. 
In February 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM) began drafting contingency plans to protect U.S. personnel and property 
and plans to keep the Panama Canal open.218 The initial plan involved a massive buildup 
of U.S. forces on U.S. bases in Panama in an effort to intimidate Noriega. These plans 
were in development throughout the 1988 presidential campaigns, and in January 1989, 
President Bush inherited the plans. 
 When President Bush took office, the situation was continuing to rapidly degrade 
in Panama, so Bush increased pressure on Noriega. Noriega’s PDF was routinely 
harassing and assaulting U.S. military personnel and their families. Bush responded by 
ordering nearly constant readiness exercises for forces in and headed to Panama and 
continued the buildup of forces in the canal zone to intimidate Noriega to step down.219 
When that did not work, Bush authorized the release of $10 million to support Noriega’s 
political opposition in the 1989 Panamanian presidential election.220 When Noriega’s 
hand-picked candidates were losing the election, Noriega’s men removed and replaced 
tally sheets showing votes against his candidates.221 The opposition candidate declared 
that he had won the presidency, appealed to the international community for assistance, 
and called for protests in the streets of Panama. Noriega responded by dispatching the 
PDF to forcefully quell the riots, and overturned the election results, declaring the 
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election invalid due to foreign interference.222 Bush then authorized limited support for 
an attempted coup on October 3, 1989 in which a few members of the PDF turned on and 
captured Noriega. The coup failed, however, when rebels allowed Noriega to call his 
mistress who then called reinforcements loyal to Noriega. After hours of firefighting, 
Noriega loyalists defeated, arrested, tortured, and killed those responsible for the coup. 
Although the United States did not provide direct support for the coup, service members 
did block roads as requested by those responsible for the coup, further escalating tensions 
between Noriega and U.S. forces in Panama.223  
In December 1989, the situation in Panama reached its flashpoint. As Cole 
explains, on December 15, the national council voted to put Panama in a state of war with 
the United States, and Noriega was named Maximum Leader. On December 16, PDF 
harassment of U.S. military personnel had gone too far. Four U.S. military officers 
refused to vacate their vehicle at a PDF checkpoint, at which time the PDF guard loaded 
his rifle. The U.S. soldiers sped away because of the hostile act. The PDF soldier fired at 
the fleeing car, wounding three of the officers. Marine Corps First Lieutenant Robert Paz 
was one of the injured and later died from the gunshot wounds. A U.S. naval officer and 
his wife witnessed the event, resulting in their being detained and assaulted. On 
December 17, President Bush was briefed of the events that occurred the day before, and 
after careful deliberations about the chance of the PDF seizing of U.S. hostages and other 
non-military options, Bush gave the order to execute BLUE SPOON, the contingency 
plan to remove Noriega.224 
2. Execution 
December 20, 1989, Operation Just Cause commenced with 27,000 U.S. troops 
invading Panama, from both the Canal Zone and in an airborne assault to, according to 
President Bush’s speech to the nation, “safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend 
democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the 
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Panama Canal treaty.”225 Bush added to accomplish these objectives, Noriega must 
be detained and brought to justice in the United States.226 The operation itself entailed 
a coordinated strike on twenty-seven command and control stations with conventional 
and special operations forces.227 Furthermore, defensive actions were taken to ensure 
the safety of Americans in Panama and safety of the canal. Task Forces were used 
to target key PDF units, and finally, a mechanized infantry battalion was used to seize 
the Comandancia (the PDF headquarters).228 Overall, the operation consisted of 
just over four days of fighting, with most of it occurring the first day, and resulted in 
314 PDF killed-in-action, 124 wounded, and over 5000 detained, while the U.S. suffered 
19 killed.229 
3. Analysis 
Operation Just Cause was a success because all objectives were completed in an 
expeditious manner, in part due to the relationship President Bush enjoyed with the 
Intelligence Community. The relationship between the president and Intelligence 
Community contributed to the success of Operation Just Cause mainly in the planning 
process as well as with the DCI’s lack of a policy agenda. Antizzo noted that the IC was 
instrumental in correctly analyzing adversary actions to determine primary targets for 
attack upon the commencement of the operation.230 He also noted that American forces 
stationed in Panama prior to the start of hostilities were familiar with target sites and 
local infrastructure which aided in quickly accomplishing their objectives.231 Throughout 
the planning process and implementation of the operation, DCI Webster remained 
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committed to providing information to the president, and not pursuing a specific course 
of action. As a result, Webster is often criticized as being a weak DCI with allegations 
that he was relegated to the sideline during important policy decisions, to which he 
replied, “the CIA has to maintain its objectivity, so that my access cannot be used to 
advocate particular policy issues. My role is to be sure that the intelligence implications 
of a policy decision are fully known.”232 
Antizzo and Taw both faulted the IC in providing accurate, timely, tactical 
information—namely the whereabouts of Noriega—to battlefield commanders during the 
operation, largely due to interagency barriers.233 The information, however, was reaching 
the president and NSC so when the commanders had questions, the NSC could always 
provide answers.234 Although Bush relied heavily on the PDB as a method of 
communication with the IC, it was not a useful tool during hostilities in Panama. Bush’s 
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft noted that the PDB was not designed for fast 
moving tactical situations. A good briefer, though, would supplement the PDB with the 
most current reporting on a fast moving situation, which worked to keep the president 
apprised of developments throughout Operation Just Cause.235 
The final note about the impact of the relationship on the successful execution of 
Operation Just Cause focuses specifically on the absence of the DCI in persuading 
President Bush to act in Panama. Instead, Webster left the planning and execution of the 
military operations to the JCS, regional Combatant Commander, and SECDEF. As noted 
by Caw, the plans for invading Panama had been drafted by SOUTHCOM Commander, 
General Thurman and had been approved as a contingency operation by President Bush, 
SECDEF Cheney, and the CJCS General Powell.236 Following the death of Lieutenant 
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Paz, Joint Chiefs of Staff were the ones responsible for recommending the 
commencement of the invasion after reviewing the intelligence.237 This is significant 
because, unlike the failure at the Bay of Pigs, DCI Webster focused on strictly providing 
intelligence instead of providing only intelligence that supports a policy as Allen Dulles 
did under President Kennedy. In fact, although he had “more access to the president of 
the United States than any of the previous thirteen CIA directors,” he intentionally did 
not have a role in policy making because, as an intelligence professional, it was his job to 
remain objective.238This demonstrates the significance of the DCI remaining neutral in 
policy decisions.  
F. RELATIONSHIP MAINTENANCE 
Unlike President Kennedy, President Bush enjoyed early intelligence and 
operational success with the ousting of General Noriega from Panama. As a result, 
whereas Kennedy had to completely overhaul his relationship with the IC, Bush merely 
had to maintain his already thriving relationship. He accomplished this by continuing the 
endeavors undertaken in his early presidency. He met with the DCI regularly, provided 
written comments and feedback on the PDB, and in general, cared about intelligence. 
After his time as DCI, Webster reflected on Bush and stated that as a former DCI, Bush 
cared about intelligence and wanted it directly from the agencies—not filtered through 
the White House staff as many of his predecessors preferred.239  
The continued positive relationship ensured policymakers remained highly 
informed as Iraqi troops massed along the Kuwaiti border. Initial analysis indicated that it 
was merely an intimidation tactic, however, Central Intelligence Agency analysts 
reversed their assessment overnight on August 1, 1990 stating that Saddam would soon 
invade Kuwait.240 President Bush was informed of the change at 5:00 AM, but before 
Bush could call Saddam to talk him out of invading, Iraqi forces pushed across the 
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Kuwaiti border, and thus began the planning and execution of Operations Desert Storm 
and Desert Shield. 
G. OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM  
Bush’s continued positive relationship with the Intelligence Community again 
paid dividends in 1990–1991 when Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion and annexation 
of Kuwait. Because of his relationship, Bush was informed of and receptive to the 
assessment that Hussein’s forces were about to invade Kuwait prior to its commencement 
Additionally, the IC was instrumental in the planning process, identifying targets for the 
air command. DCI Webster’s relationship with President Bush was also instrumental in 
the operation’s success because unlike the military sources, the CIA’s PDB more 
accurately assessed the destruction of Iraqi armor which was the primary criteria for the 
authorization of the ground war.  
1. The Iraqi Invasion   
Saddam Hussein chose to invade Kuwait for several reasons. First, Hussein felt as 
though he, and Iraq’s army had defended the Arab world from Persian Shia 
fundamentalism coming out of Iran in the costly eight year Iran-Iraq War that concluded 
in 1988.241 As a result, Hussein felt as though the other Arab nations should help with the 
cost of the war.242 Second, Saddam long considered Kuwait to be a nineteenth province 
of Iraq. Saddam believed that the British carved Kuwait out of the Turkish province of 
Basra, and after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it had been stripped from Iraq.243 The 
land dispute was settled in 1963 when the Baathist regime recognized Kuwait, but flared 
again in the late 80s with the discovery of the Rumalla oil fields.244 The border split the 
highly profitable oil fields, and Hussein accused the Kuwaitis of slant drilling to steal the 
oil from Iraq. As a result, Hussein demanded reparations from Kuwait and Kuwait 
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refused to pay.245 Finally, Hussein felt as though had U.S. permission to invade 
Kuwait—or at least an assurance that the United States would not get involved. 
According to Brigham, at a July 25, 1990 meeting, Ambassador Glaspie allegedly told 
Saddam that the United States “has no opinion on the Arab–Arab conflicts, like your 
border disagreement with Kuwait.246 Later in the same meeting, Glaspie did warn 
Saddam that the United States would not tolerate hostilities in the region, and that the 
United States was concerned with Saddam’s force build up on the Iraqi–Kuwaiti 
border.247 Saddam assured the ambassador that he understood the U.S. position, yet, he 
ordered his troops across the border a week later.248 On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces 
invaded Kuwait, seizing the capital by early afternoon, and Iraq officially annexed 
Kuwait on August 8, 1990.249 
2. Authorizing Desert Shield 
Although the U.S. Intelligence Community predicted the invasion, the 
international community was shocked because it did not believe an Arab country would 
attack another Arab country. The invasion prompted the immediate passage of multiple 
UN resolutions to include: one that imposed sanctions on Iraq pending the withdrawal 
from Kuwait; the second, one that voided the recognition of the annexation of Kuwait; 
one that allowed for military action to enforce the embargo; most significantly, was the 
passage of a resolution that mandated the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces by January 15, 
1991 or face international military action.250 The UN resolutions were important because 
they gave the U.S. time to build a coalition to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait as well as 
the authority to conduct action. 
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Immediately following the fall of Kuwait, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell discussed the possibility of 
concentrating U.S. troops along the Saudi–Kuwaiti border with the Saudi Arabian 
ambassador. Using satellite imagery of the Iraqi military presence along the border, they 
persuaded the ambassador to allow the coalition forces to begin troop deployments in 
Saudi territory in an effort to shield Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi invasion.251 Operation 
Desert Shield was the name given to that “massive build-up of U.S. forces in and around 
Saudi Arabia to protect it from Saddam’s Republican Guard now poised on the Saudi 
border.”252 
During Operation Desert Shield, the Intelligence Community was vital in 
determining Iraqi troop strength and locations. The president was seeing those 
assessments daily in both the PDB and the National Intelligence Daily253 (NID); 
however, the assessments differed as the operations progressed, leading to strife between 
the various organizations within the IC and confusion among senior policymakers.254 
During this period, DCI Webster was instrumental in reconciling differences in reporting 
and disputes between the agencies. President Bush trusted his DCI and when it came to 
commencing the ground war, relied heavily on the DCI and the PDB.  
3. Defeating Saddam in Kuwait 
The United Nations’ resolutions gave the Iraqi army until January 15, 1991 to 
withdraw from Iraq, but Saddam refused. As a result, Operation Desert Storm began with 
an executive order following a confirmation that the military was ready.255 On January 
16, hostilities commenced with B-52 bombers targeting Iraqi air defense and command 
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and control.256 Because Iraq had very centralized control of its integrated air defense, 
within a few days of strikes, the Iraqi air defense was suppressed or destroyed.257 The air 
campaign then moved on to target Iraqi armor which was the aspect of the campaign in 
which the DCI’s relationship with the president was most important as discussed in next 
section. On February 22, after over a month of aerial bombardment, President Bush gave 
Saddam one last chance to leave Kuwait.258 Saddam incorrectly assessed that his troops 
would be able to inflict substantial casualties in the early phases of the ground war which 
would sour the American public’s view of the war, and withdraw support.259 Instead, the 
United States feigned an amphibious invasion to distract the most elite Iraqi units while 
the main force pushed North from Saudi Arabia. As a result, the coalition troops pushed 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait in a mere 100 hours.260  
In the early phases of Desert Shield, Bush announced the goals of the operations. 
He stated that the U.S. wanted the following: the complete and immediate withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the reinstatement of the legitimate Kuwaiti government; 
protection of U.S. citizens in Kuwait and Iraq; and regional security and stability in the 
Middle East.261 By the end of February 1991, and the quick defeat of Hussein’s forces in 
Kuwait, the identified objectives of the operation had been successfully completed, 
demonstrating additional operational successes during Bush’s presidency.   
4. Role of the IC and its Relationship with the President 
Reviews of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm highlighted severe 
intelligence failures at the tactical level, but the failures did not extend to the president 
and NSC. The official congressional report identified the IC as failing to understand the 
intelligence needs of battlefield commanders, failure to collect tactical level imagery, and 
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failures in conducting Battle Damage Assessments regarding the destruction of Iraqi 
armor.262 These intelligence failures did not contribute to an operational failure, however, 
in large part due to DCI Webster and President Bush’s relationship. Priess explained, that 
the military reporting was predominantly based on pilot reporting whereas the CIA 
reporting was based on sensitive reconnaissance reporting.263 Based on first looks from 
high resolution satellite imagery and U-2 photos, the analysts for the PDB saw functional 
armor despite airstrikes. As a result, the PDB consistently reflected lower battle damage 
assessments than were being reported in the NID from the DOD sources because they 
were based predominantly on pilot post-mission reporting.264 This caused tensions to rise 
between DCI Webster and DOD entities, including U.S. Central Command Commander 
General Schwarzkopf and the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who accused 
the CIA of a conspiracy to delay the ground war.265 As Bush did when he was DCI and 
having issues with Kissinger, Webster went to the president to discuss the issue. 
President Bush understood why the CIA reporting was different, equating the defense 
intelligence as faulty due to pilot euphoria, and made his decision based on Webster’s 
reporting, demonstrating the significance of the relationship between the DCI and 
president in operational success.266 
H. CONCLUSION 
President Bush cultivated a positive relationship between the president and 
Intelligence Community both as DCI and as president. He used the same tactic for both: 
get the analyst in front of the president so the president can provide direct feedback to the 
analyst as well as bolster the morale of the analysts because they know their work is 
reaching the highest office in the United States and being used to make foreign policy 
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decisions. Bush demonstrated the significance of communication—both through written 
feedback and vocalized from president to intelligence professional—in establishing a 
positive working relationship. Those lines of communication ensured the president 
received the most up-to-date, accurate information available during tactical operations, 
allowing him to make decisions that contributed to success in Operations Just Cause, 
Desert Shield, and Desert Storm.  
Although operational and tactical level commanders criticized the Intelligence 
Community during Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm, tactical, 
operational, and strategic level intelligence reports were making it to the highest office. 
This temporarily slowed the pace of the operations, however, intelligence reporting to 
Bush allowed him to make decisions that ensured success, as demonstrated by the armor 
destruction reports marking the transition from Desert Shield to Desert Storm.  
Bush’s presidency answered questions posed by this thesis because Bush 
established a positive relationship with the Intelligence Community. The relationship was 
cultivated by encouraging open communications between his DCI, analysts, and himself. 
Furthermore, he was receptive to the information being provided. He also appointed a 
strong leader, devoid of political motivation, with a compatible personality as DCI. His 
positive relationship contributed to success in multiple major military operations. 
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V. COUNTERARGUMENT, FINDINGS, AND 
FURTHER STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis used case studies of Presidents George H.W. Bush and John F. 
Kennedy to demonstrate that the relationship between the president and Intelligence 
Community serves as a factor in the chance of an operation’s success or failure. 
Furthermore, Kennedy demonstrated that a poor relationship can be remedied if the 
president is receptive to changes and disciplined in implementing the changes. This 
chapter will serve to address the argument that the relationship does not have an impact 
on success or failure by evaluating George W. Bush’s presidency. It will then outline the 
key findings from the research and provide suggestions that will help future 
administrations and DNIs to form an effective working relationship. Finally, this chapter 
will suggest areas of further studies.   
B. COUNTERARGUMENT 
This thesis has shown a slight correlation between the president’s relationship 
with the Intelligence Community, and the frequency of success or failures in his 
presidency. The good relationship Kennedy enjoyed following the appointment of DCI 
McCone, and George H.W. Bush267 enjoyed for the duration of his presidency, 
contributed to successes for both presidents. Following that argument, President George 
W. Bush should have only seen successes. Instead, he was in office for two enormous 
failures. This case, however, does not disprove the earlier findings because the 
intelligence had faults. The failure to find WMDs in Iraq, and thus the highly criticized 
invasion, occurred because the strong relationship allowed the faulty intelligence to be 
communicated to the president. Furthermore, because DCI Tenet was not appointed by 
President Bush, Tenet likely felt the need to provide the intelligence the president wanted 
in an effort to remain in his position. 
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President George W. Bush entered his presidency with a great relationship with 
the IC, but he witnessed two massive failures in office: the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 and the faulty analysis of Iraq’s WMD program. The occurrence of these 
substantial failures in a period during which an effective relationship between the 
president and IC appears to disprove earlier correlations between status of relationship 
and chance of success, but instead, it emphasizes the importance of the information’s 
accuracy even when a strong relationship exists. It also serves to show that, although 
relationships are a factor that can contribute to success or failures, the relationship is not 
the only reason for the occurrence of failures or successes.  
George W. Bush’s relationship with the Intelligence Community, like all 
presidents since Eisenhower, began when he was announced as the Republican nominee 
for the 2000 presidential election. The early interactions set the stage for a strong 
relationship upon entering office because George W. Bush was insistent on receiving 
regular briefings and was engaged in the briefings. According to Helgerson, Bush’s first 
briefing took place on September 2, 2000. The briefing lasted over four hours, and the 
briefers noted that Bush was one of the most interactive customers they had the pleasure 
of briefing.268 To the IC, the length of the brief and Bush’s receptivity to the information 
indicated the desire to form a strong relationship. While waiting for the election results to 
be adjudicated, Bush indicated his desire to form a strong relationship with the IC by 
stating, “I had great respect for the CIA in large part because of my father’s admiration 
and respect for the CIA. Therefore, when I got elected president, my inclinations towards 
the CIA were very positive.”269 Finally, according to Priess, some Agency officials have 
described George W. Bush’s presidency as a golden age for the IC because he was “an 
active and engaged president who not only wanted an in-person intelligence briefing 
every working day but also started bringing his brier with him whenever he traveled.”270 
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Based on these comments and early interactions, it is clear that Bush began his 
presidency with a strong relationship with the IC.  
During the pre-election period, two points arose that should have raised concerns 
about the relationship with the Intelligence Community: first, Presidential candidate Bush 
and Vice President candidate Cheney made very specific allegations regarding Iraq’s 
WMD program during debates, referencing inadequate intelligence.271 Second, Bush, at 
times, asked for recommendations from his intelligence briefers that bordered on asking 
for input for policy decisions.272 Those factors, coupled with DCI Tenet’s personality, 
contributed to the inaccurate assessment of Iraq’s WMD program that served as the basis 
for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
President Bush’s decision to keep George Tenet as DCI contributed to the 
inaccurate assessment of the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction because as President 
Clinton’s DCI, Tenet had previously demonstrated political tendencies and, to keep his 
job, Tenet provided intelligence to support the president’s preconceived notions. Tenet’s 
political tendencies were evident before Bush entered office. According to Helgerson, 
Tenet did not provide Bush’s transition period briefs because he was in the Middle East 
negotiating a peace settlement between Israel and Palestine.273 This demonstrates that 
Tenet was amenable to supporting policy objectives, instead of focusing on solely 
providing unbiased information to aid the policymaker. Furthermore, Tenet was a 
holdover from Clinton’s administration, and as a result, Tenet felt as though he was not a 
part of Bush’s team, nor was he off it.274 Bush initially intended on replacing Tenet with 
Donald Rumsfeld, but instead named Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defense. Bush chose 
to keep Tenet on indefinitely instead of replacing him because he did not have any other  
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candidates in mind, and he felt as though keeping Clinton’s DCI on would demonstrate 
that Bush wanted to keep politics out of intelligence.275 Tenet was clearly worried about 
keeping his job, noting that for a brief period following Bush’s inauguration, Tenet made 
it a point not to attend every PDB briefing to avoid the appearance that he was advocating 
for his job.276 As a result, this likely left Tenet feeling as though he needed to find 
intelligence to support Bush’s policy objectives instead of providing unbiased 
information so Bush could make the best decision. This contributed to the creation of a 
NIE based on single source inaccurate reporting.277 Furthermore, one of Tenet’s division 
chiefs alleges that he told Tenet that the foreign intelligence service providing the 
reporting had known source management and reporting problems, but Tenet dismissed 
the chief.278 According to the report, these views were shared by many senior CIA 
leaders, but these doubts were never expressed to the administration—not because of 
ineffective communications, but because of a “serious failure of management and 
leadership.”279 This supports the notion that Tenet failed to report information counter to 
Bush’s notion that Iraq was aggressively pursuing WMDs, but instead, provided 
information reinforcing the incorrect perception.  
The reporting of single-source intelligence, code named “Curveball,” to the 
president in an effort to support President Bush’s notion that Iraq was developing WMDs 
by a DCI with reservations about the accuracy of the information impacted the failure, 
and not the relationship. Had Bush appointed an unbiased DCI and developed the same 
relationship with that DCI as he had with Tenet, the decision to invade Iraq could have 
been averted. The relationship itself was instrumental in ensuring communications 
between the IC and president; however, the DCI, serving as the liaison, was more  
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interested in keeping his job than accurately representing the IC. As a result, the failure 
was not because of the relationship but instead occurred because of the DCI’s political 
nature.  
The surprise attack on 9/11 does not disprove the importance of a good 
relationship between the IC and the president because the attack was not prevented due to 
a lack of collection and analysis instead of a lack of communication. This thesis contends 
that an effective relationship hinges on good communication and that communication will 
enable success and mitigate failure. In the case of 9/11, the intelligence was not available 
to communicate to the president or it likely would have been acted on. The 9/11 
Commission Report found the IC responsible for failing to “connect the dots.” Whether 
that happened due to a high level of noise with very few “signals,” (as identified with 
hindsight bias) or due to a lack of tactical level intelligence to act upon as suggested by 
Dahl does not negate the fact that surprise attacks can occur, regardless of the 
effectiveness of the president’s relationship with the IC. If the information is not 
available, it cannot be used to thwart potential failures, and as a result, does not disprove 
the previous findings regarding the impact of relationship on success. 
C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The president’s relationship with the IC does have an impact on the chance of 
intelligence or operational failures or successes. Kennedy and George H.W. Bush both 
demonstrated that when a positive relationship existed between the president and the IC, 
president’s witnessed more operational and intelligence success. That being said, the 
relationship is only a component of what contributes to success or failures. President 
George W. Bush had a phenomenal relationship with the IC yet the IC failed to predict 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and failed to accurately assess the status of Saddam Hussein’s 
WMD program. Additionally, a failure can serve as a catalyst that spurs a change in the 
relationship, but does not mean that the relationship will change. President Kennedy 
demonstrated that a president that is receptive to change and willing to put in the work for 
a change, the relationship between the IC and president can be repaired and lead to 
success. President Clinton, on the other hand, did not. Following the failures in 
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Mogadishu, President Clinton only temporarily placed a higher importance on foreign 
intelligence. After a short period, intelligence fell off as a priority for Clinton which set 
the stage for additional failures, demonstrating that he was not receptive to change, 
despite the failures, resulting in continued failure. 
This thesis has also identified three key findings and proposes accompanying 
recommendations. The first key finding of this study is that a poor relationship between 
the president and intelligence community will usually be reevaluated and often remedied 
following a major intelligence failure whereas good relationship will not necessarily 
suffer due to a massive intelligence failure. The second key finding is that trust and good 
communication must exist between the president and his DCI/DNI for a positive 
relationship to exist and for that trust and communication to exist, the president must 
appoint his own DCI/DNI following his inauguration. The IC must accept and follow the 
appointed leadership and the appointee must take to position with grace, faith, and trust in 
the community. 
The president should appoint his own DNI shortly after taking office because 
access and trust are vital to national security and mitigating failures. The newly appointed 
DCI should be well accepted by the IC, but more importantly, should have access to the 
president. Under Kennedy, Dulles was a holdover from the Eisenhower administration, 
and as a result, was never fully trusted by the Kennedy administration, nor did Dulles 
have regular access to Kennedy. McCone, on the other hand, was Kennedy’s appointee, 
had access to the president, and succeeded. The same was true with  
Another key finding: the DNI should provide the support necessary for the 
president to make the most informed decision, but should not provide policy 
recommendations. DCI Dulles supported covert action in Cuba whereas DCI McCone 
provided imagery of missile sites, intelligence on missile capabilities, and intelligence 
support on naval activity in the Caribbean during the Cuban Missile Crisis; however, he 
did not provide policy recommendations on how President Kennedy should respond to 
the intelligence provided. Instead, the other principals and members of ExComm debated 
the strategies and implications to provide recommendations to President Kennedy, who 
ultimately made the decision to impose a quarantine while working back channels to 
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work out a diplomatic solution. The decision to invade Iraq, however, was an example of 
DCI Tenet supporting a policy with intelligence, instead of using intelligence to inform 
President Bush.  
Another finding involves communication and receptivity. Upon being appointed 
or inaugurated, it is imperative that the DNI and president establish a method of 
communication, whether that be face-to-face or through a briefing process. It is up to the 
DNI to determine the needs of the president and how he would like to receive 
information and ensure the IC is providing the intelligence in that manner. Kennedy was 
not receiving intelligence in a useful manner at the beginning of his presidency, and that 
contributed to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. George H.W. Bush, and Kennedy 
in the second half of his presidency, in contrast, was receiving intelligence in a useful 
manner which contributed to success.  
D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Because this thesis was limited to only examining a few presidents, research 
should be expanded to analyze more presidents and DCI/DNI combinations. The United 
States is on its 45 president, each of whom have made countless decisions regarding the 
safety and security of the United States, but this thesis focused predominantly on just 
three presidents and six events. In depth analysis of all post-World War II presidential 
relationships with the IC and how the relationship impacted all operations and reactions 
to world events would expand the dataset and allow for a more complete analysis of the 
relationship’s impacts.  
Additionally, a study comparing and contrasting the DCI and DNI should be 
conducted to analyze the efficacy of the newly created position. The DNI position has 
been considered a necessity off and on since the 1970s. As time commences, a 
comparison between how the DNI interacts with the NSC and IC as a whole would 
illuminate if the creation of the position has had a positive or negative impact on the 
frequency of intelligence failures.  
This study focused only on U.S. operations and the relationship between the 
president and U.S. intelligence community. Additional studies evaluating foreign 
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governmental leaders and their respective intelligence communities during failures and 
successes could also be conducted to provide insight into what does and does not work 
for various types of government.  
Finally, a study evaluating the impacts of elevating the DNI to a Cabinet-level 
position should be evaluated. Based on this thesis, one could assume that doing so would 
improve access to the president; however, Reagan and Clinton both witnessed substantial 
failures with the DCI in a cabinet level position. Trump is the first president to raise his 
DNI as a Cabinet level official. The evaluation of how this impacts the relationship, 
access to the president, and influence among the other cabinet positions could also help 
mitigate future failures.    
E. FINAL COMMENTS 
Although the relationship between the IC and the president has been determined 
to have an impact the chance of failures and successes that occur during a presidency, it 
is not the only factor that contributes to intelligence failures. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the above recommendations will not guarantee that failures will not 
occur on a president’s watch. Instead, this thesis merely identified what is sometimes a 
contributing factor to intelligence failures and suggested possible corrective actions. 
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